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Neoliberal Civil Procedure
Luke Norris*
This Article argues that the current era of U.S. civil procedure is defined by its
neoliberalism. The Supreme Court has over the past few decades reinterpreted the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in ways that have made it more difficult for citizens to bring and
maintain civil claims. The major decisions of this new era—in areas as diverse as summary
judgment, pleading, class actions, and arbitration—exhibit neoliberal hallmarks. They
display neoliberalism’s tendency to naturalize existing market arrangements, its focus on
efficiency and obscuring questions of power, its reduction of citizens to consumers, and its
attempt to analyze government through the lens of market-modeled concepts. As the Court’s
procedural decisions make it increasingly difficult for citizens to bring claims enforcing
regulatory law—including antitrust, antidiscrimination, consumer protection, and worker
protection laws—the Court’s neoliberal orientation lurks in the background and helps to
explain procedure’s modern progression. In order to fully appreciate, critique, and potentially
move beyond the current era of U.S. civil procedure, it is important to understand the
neoliberal logic that drives it, as well as the logics and values it obscures and sidelines.
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INTRODUCTION
U.S. law is increasingly neoliberal. Neoliberalism, broadly speaking, is a legal,
political, and economic project and method of thought that prizes existing market
arrangements—obscuring the questions of power, distribution, and inequality that
underlie them, as well as the role of law, politics, and culture in shaping them—and
seeks as a result to minimize ongoing democratic efforts to reshape those
arrangements.1 Neoliberalism valorizes existing market relationships by conceiving

1. See, e.g., David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100, 147 (2018)
(“[ N ]eoliberalism [ is ] a style of thinking and policy making characterized by market-fundamentalist
premises and a constricted view of democratic possibilities for reshaping economic relations . . . .”).
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of them as natural and favorable.2 And it seeks to reorder law and public institutions
to mimic market arrangements and to shield existing market arrangements from
democratic efforts to reorder them to align with other values.3 Neoliberalism offers
a “pervasive view of law that encases ‘the market’ from claims of justice and
conceals it from analyses of power.”4 Scholars have shown how neoliberalism has
permeated an array of U.S. legal fields, including constitutional, antitrust,
employment discrimination, intellectual property, and family law.5
Our federal civil procedure is neoliberal, too. A series of doctrinal shifts over
the past few decades have ushered in a new era of civil procedure. The Supreme
Court has erected hurdles for plaintiffs at the pleading, class certification, discovery,
and summary judgment stages, and it has made it harder for plaintiffs to get into
court in the first place through its arbitration rulings.6 Scholars tend to understand
these shifts as moving away from the commitments of the previous era of civil
procedure to accessible and flexible rules that facilitate the resolution of disputes on
the merits.7 The story is one of the advent of a “restrictive ethos” in civil procedure.8
But there is also more to the story. In order to fully appreciate the current era of
civil procedure—and in particular, the obstacles that the Supreme Court has placed
in the way of citizens seeking to bring claims enforcing regulatory law governing the
market—we also need to understand the era’s neoliberalism.
Several features define neoliberalism. They include a focus on
market-modeled concepts of efficiency permitted in part by assumptions of
neutrality; a concomitant lack of focus on questions of power, distribution, and
inequality; a tendency to naturalize existing market arrangements; and an attempt to
remake the government and citizens in the image of the market and thereby to
constrict the possibilities for democratic reordering of existing market
arrangements.9 The doctrines that define the new era of procedure comprise these
neoliberal hallmarks and enlarge and complicate our understanding of them.10
Across doctrinal areas, the Court has developed and elevated a narrow vision of
2. See infra Section I.A; see also, e.g., Jedediah Britton-Purdy, David Singh Grewal, Amy
Kapczynski & K. Sabeel Rahman, Building a Law-and-Political-Economy Framework: Beyond the
Twentieth-Century Synthesis, 129 YALE L.J. 1784, 1795–97 (2020) (exploring how neoliberalism is
founded on and encases the “autonomy” of the market).
3. See infra Section I.A.
4. Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 2, at 1784.
5. See infra notes 23–27 and accompanying text.
6. See infra Parts II, III.
7. While many scholars have discussed the procedural shifts of the past several decades, Stephen
N. Subrin and Thomas O. Main have categorized “eras” of civil procedure and marked the current one
as the “fourth era” of U.S. civil procedure. See generally Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The
Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839 (2014).
8. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the
Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 333–34 (2013)
(exploring the departure); A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure,
78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 353–54 (2010) (defining the “restrictive ethos”).
9. See infra Section I.A.
10. See infra Section I.B.
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efficiency, focused on reducing defendants’ costs and ignoring other variables. And
along the way, it has erased from its decisions historical considerations of power,
especially where plaintiffs go up against corporate Goliaths.11 The Court has
naturalized existing market arrangements by layering plausibility standards onto
procedural analysis, defining what is plausible market behavior through economists’
visions of efficiency that tend to naturalize that behavior. Finally, the Court has
viewed judicial procedures and the citizens who use them through the lens of the
market-modeled concepts. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules) and
their layering of process are construed as, among other things, clunky, burdensome,
and inefficient as compared to private processes. And citizens are construed as
consumers seeking efficient processes—especially in private fora such as
arbitration—that maximize individual preferences and work best where aggregate
litigation is not pursued.
The result is that procedural interpretation is increasingly a mechanism for the
Court to define judicial processes, the citizens who use them, and market
arrangements in neoliberal terms. While the Court’s procedural decisions generally
apply across civil cases, they also bear a special relationship to regulatory
litigation—to individual and group claims seeking to enforce federal regulatory
legislation. The U.S. regulatory system is somewhat distinctive for the extent to
which it relies on lawsuits by ordinary citizens to enforce regulatory legislation.12
This system, often referred to as one of private enforcement, encompasses, among
other things, antidiscrimination suits seeking to eradicate discrimination based on
sex or race in the workplace, antitrust suits seeking to keep markets stable and fair,
and employment suits seeking to protect workers’ basic dignity and security.13
Private enforcement lawsuits are part of a process through which the public and the
government develop and refine the democratic and legislative norms governing
economic and social life.14
Neoliberal civil procedure undermines this regulatory process subtly but
effectively. By employing plausibility analysis, the Court naturalizes the market
11. While this Article often focuses on instances where individual or groups of plaintiffs square
off against larger, institutional defendants, there are other power dynamics that constitute much of our
litigation landscape. For example, in some instances, as Daniel Wilf-Townsend shows, large
corporate firms, and in particular debt-collection firms, are the plaintiffs, engaging in what he calls
assembly-line litigation. See generally Daniel Wilf-Townsend, Assembly-Line Plaintiffs, 135
HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022).
12. See generally STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND
RETRENCHMENT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION (2017) [ hereinafter
BURBANK & FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT ]; Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang,
Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543 (2014) [ hereinafter
Burbank & Farhang, Litigation Reform ].
13. See generally Burbank & Farhang, Litigation Reform, supra note 12 (outlining the various forms
of legislation that are enforced by private citizens through lawsuits).
14. See Stephen B. Burbank, Sean Farhang & Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 637, 666 (2013) (articulating the various roles of “private enforcement” litigation). See
generally Luke Norris, The Promise and Perils of Private Enforcement (Jan. 27, 2022) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).

Clean Final Edit_Norris_v2.docx (Do Not Delete)

2022 ]

NEOLIBERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE

2/1/22 9:20 PM

475

arrangements that litigants challenge as deviating from regulatory commands, often
keeping cases from getting to juries. By minimizing questions of power and
distribution in procedural decision-making and focusing on a narrow view of
efficiency, the Court paves the way for procedural decisions that make it harder for
private enforcer-plaintiffs to bring and maintain their suits. The Court thus saps
from the Rules other values that would support—and historically have
supported—construing them to facilitate private enforcement. And the Court’s dim
view of judicial procedures and construal of litigants as individualized consumers
seeking more efficient processes lead it to disable the very kinds of public, often
collective, litigation that best enable regulatory law to be enforced and developed.
Procedure provides the gateways and pathways for citizens to bring regulatory
claims, and the Court’s neoliberal decisions litter those gateways and pathways with
roadblocks and exit ramps.15
Having shown the prominence of neoliberalism in modern U.S. procedure,
this Article next examines its distinctiveness and the forces behind its rise.
Neoliberal civil procedure, I argue, is defined by several characteristics. It is
subterranean, largely lost from public view and avoiding the scrutiny that comes
with non-procedural judicial interpretation. And it is basic, broad, and integrating,
sweeping across civil statutory, constitutional, and common law disputes in federal
courts and often influencing state procedure as well. Neoliberalism in procedure
also arises from both familiar and distinctive forces. As is the story elsewhere,
neoliberalism began to take grip in civil procedure in the 1970s. The forces that have
contributed to its rise include the prominence of economics in the legal academy
and the judiciary, the corporatization of U.S. legal practice and the rulemaking
process, the increasingly corporate makeup of the judiciary, the politicization of
procedure by corporate leaders and politicians, and the resource scarcity federal
courts have faced in light of caseloads and resulting pressures to remake themselves
in the image of businesses and to manage cases more efficiently. Neoliberal civil
procedure fits into the account of the larger rise of legal neoliberalism but is also
shaped by its own historical and institutional forces.
This Article explores the rise of neoliberal civil procedure in three parts.
Part I briefly surveys the core characteristics of neoliberalism. Part II analyzes how
those characteristics have come to define procedure in major Supreme Court
decisions of the current era of procedure. It shows how the Court’s summary
judgment, pleading, arbitration, and class action decisions, among others, are
neoliberal in orientation. Part III analyzes what is distinctive about neoliberal civil
procedure, as well as the forces that fueled its rise. The Conclusion explores at a
high level what moving beyond neoliberal civil procedure may entail.
This Article’s core contribution is to reveal the logic of the new era of civil
procedure. Much ink has been spilled in the service of tracking, analyzing, and
15. See Joanna C. Schwartz, Gateways and Pathways in Civil Procedure, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1652,
1654–55 (2013) (exploring and defining various procedures as gateways and pathways).

Clean Final Edit_Norris_v2.docx (Do Not Delete)

476

2/1/22 9:20 PM

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 12:471

critiquing the shifts that characterize this new era. But we need to understand the
era’s distinctiveness—what drives it—before we can fully approach and critique it.
We need to appreciate procedure’s neoliberalism in order to potentially resist it.
I. NEOLIBERALISM: A PRIMER
This Part describes some of neoliberalism’s core characteristics to lay a
foundation for understanding how they translate to procedure. It focuses on how
neoliberal thought prizes efficiency, sidelines questions of power and distribution,
depoliticizes and naturalizes existing market arrangements, aims to remake the
government in the image of the market, and conceives of citizens as atomistic
consumers within the market-state.
A. The Concept
Neoliberalism is a term used to describe the “revival of the doctrines of
classical economic liberalism, also called laissez-faire, in politics, ideas, and law.”16
At its core, neoliberalism prizes existing market arrangements, insulating them from
democratic contest and control, and seeks to remake the State and its citizens in the
image of the market.17 As David Grewal and Jedediah Britton-Purdy put it,
“Neoliberalism, like classical liberalism before it, is also associated with a kind of
ideological expansionism, in which market-modeled concepts of efficiency and
autonomy shape policy, doctrine, and other discourses of legitimacy outside of
traditionally ‘economic’ areas.”18 This market-modeled exceptionalism, however,
can come into conflict with democracy because its values can both “prove
incompatible with capitalistic imperatives” and because the public may “hold a set
of expectations about economic and political life that may go beyond or even
contradict market logic: for instance, a reasonable level of economic opportunity,
distributive fairness, workplace security, community and solidarity, and civic
equality.”19 Neoliberalism’s “signature move” is to construct law and politics so as
to shield existing market relationships from ongoing democratic control
and reordering.20

16. David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism,
77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014, at 1, 1.
17. See id. at 3 (“Neoliberal claims advance the market side of this contest in capitalist
democracies between capitalist imperatives and democratic demands.”). As the authors note, some
argue that the term is vague, and while it is “not conceptually neat and cannot be defined by a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions for its use[ , this is ] a problem, if it is a problem, that neoliberalism
shares with many other ‘essentially contested concepts,’ such as conservatism, individualism, and
democracy.” Id. at 2.
18. Id. at 3.
19. Id. at 3–4.
20. Id. at 5. Behind this move is the intuition that market arrangements best promote human
freedom. Id. at 6. The way that neoliberals conceive of the market fails to appreciate the structuring rule
of law and the historical variability of markets. Id. at 7.
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Neoliberalism has become the “common sense of the current moment.”21
And it is a legal project as well as an economic and political one.22 Scholars have
shown how neoliberalism has permeated an array of legal fields and their doctrines,
including constitutional,23 antitrust,24 employment discrimination,25 intellectual
property,26 and family law.27
B. Its Characteristics
There are several neoliberal moves that have come to infuse these fields, and
as I explore below, they have come to infuse U.S. civil procedure, too. First,
neoliberalism “prizes a certain version of efficiency over all else.”28 And efficiency
is “typically defined—in practice if not always in theory—as a kind of ‘wealth
maximization’ that works to structurally prioritize the interests of those with more
resources.”29 Democratic laws, then, are judged from the perspective of
efficiency—of whether they maximize wealth and individual preferences.30 In this
way, neoliberalism is connected to aspects of modern law and economics
methodology and the efficiency and cost-benefit analyses that have come to define
parts of the field.31 Indeed, in various areas of law, efficiency analysis “anchors both
the descriptive framing and the normative assessment of law.”32

21. Corinne Blalock, Neoliberalism and the Crisis of Legal Theory, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
no. 4, 2014, at 71, 85.
22. See Grewal & Purdy, supra note 16, at 13 (“[ N ]eoliberal efforts necessarily rely upon (and
thus must engage) law, but also, more importantly, how apparently diverse jurisprudential trends show
the impact, both subtle and direct, of the broader neoliberal moment in which the world finds itself
today.”); id. at 1 (exploring neoliberalism as an economic and political project); see also DAVID HARVEY,
A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 17, 19 (2005) (exploring how neoliberalism can be seen “as a
political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of
economic elites” (emphasis omitted)).
23. Jedediah Purdy, Neoliberal Constitutionalism: Lochnerism for a New Economy,
77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014, at 195, 195.
24. See Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 2, at 1801–02; see also Sanjukta Paul, Antitrust as Allocator
of Coordination Rights, 67 UCLA L. REV. 378, 386 & n.18 (2020); Lina M. Khan, The End of Antitrust
History Revisited, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1655, 1665 & n.37 (2020) (reviewing TIM WU, THE CURSE OF
BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE (2018)); Lina M. Khan, Note, Amazon’s Antitrust
Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 717–22 (2017).
25. See generally Deborah Dinner, Beyond “Best Practices”: Employment-Discrimination Law in
the Neoliberal Era, 92 IND. L.J. 1059 (2017).
26. See generally Amy Kapczynski, Intellectual Property’s Leviathan, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
no. 4, 2014, at 131.
27. See generally Anne L. Alstott, Neoliberalism in U.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty and
Laissez-Faire Markets in the Minimal State, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014, at 25.
28. Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 2, at 1789.
29. Id. at 1790.
30. See id.
31. See, e.g., Blalock, supra note 21, at 89 (“Although neoliberal rationality should not be reduced
to or conflated with the theory of law and economics, the latter’s meteoric rise and proliferation within
the legal academy are undeniably symptomatic of neoliberalism’s dominance, as well as an instrument
of its dissemination.”).
32. See Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 2, at 1790.
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Second, and relatedly, neoliberalism is agnostic or even hostile to questions of
power, structure, and vulnerability.33 Neoliberalism’s focus on efficiency layers a
patina of neutrality over market arrangements, pushing aside questions of economic
power and enduring forms of inequality and insecurity.34 Unequal distributions of
power and questions of coercion, subordination, and domination are pushed out of
view by assuming relatively equal baselines.35 The result is to sideline core questions
about power and distribution that underlie existing market relationships.36 This
inattention to questions of power and structure stands in marked contrast to
theoretical approaches like those focusing on economic coercion and
subordination, and racial and gender subordination, including those founded in
critical or democratic theory.37
Third, by obscuring these forms of inequality and power, neoliberalism
depoliticizes and naturalizes existing market arrangements—themselves not natural
but the products of law, politics, and culture—and the inequalities that often
characterize them.38 By naturalizing market power and arrangements, the market
has been “allowed to operate according to its own ostensible rules and protected in
various ways from democratic reordering.”39 In this way, neoliberalism supplies “no
means to analyze, let alone counter, contemporary concentrations of wealth and
power, except insofar as they interfere with overall efficiency.”40
Fourth, neoliberalism seeks to remake the State in the image of the market. In
neoliberal thought, the State is “inertial, heavy, bureaucratic, ill-informed, and
perilously corruptible and corrupt.”41 It is an “inertial Leviathan.”42 And as a result,
where the State exists, it must come to mimic the market and be reformed to
become leaner and more “business-like.”43 The result is often to shrink the State
and its functions and regulatory capacity, thereby shielding existing forms of
economic power from further democratic interventions.44 The State, to the extent
it does function, does so mainly to facilitate individuals and entities in maximizing
their preferences.

33. See id. at 1789–90.
34. See id. at 1794–95.
35. See id. at 1813.
36. See, e.g., id. at 1820.
37. See id. at 1833–35.
38. See id. at 1790.
39. Id. at 1794.
40. Id. at 1790.
41. See Kapczynski, supra note 26, at 131–32.
42. Id. at 144.
43. See, e.g., Dinner, supra note 25, at 1067 (“Neoliberalism . . . remodels all spheres of society
on the model of the market.”); Jon D. Michaels, We the Shareholders: Government Market Participation
in the Postliberal U.S. Political Economy, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 465, 470 (2020) (connecting neoliberalism
to the idea that the “State should not only promote free enterprise but also reconstitute itself along
decidedly businesslike lines”).
44. See, e.g., Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 2, at 1810.
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Fifth, neoliberalism asserts a marketized view of the citizen as a consumer.
With its privatized logic, neoliberalism casts citizens as atomistic individuals rather
than as interdependent citizens in a social world. Citizens are reduced to consumers
trying to maximize their preferences, and personal autonomy and individualism are
tied to a vision of atomistic persons who flourish better without regulatory
intervention.45 Citizens are thought to be self-interested maximizers, not shepherds
of the common good.46 As Deborah Dinner writes, for neoliberals “the
fundamental subject of law is the individual rather than the collective” and
“[i]ndividual contracting in the market . . . is the site of individual expression and
private choice.”47 Limitations on collective action have therefore been central to the
neoliberal project. The State must seek to “authorize private ordering” but in a way
that minimizes collective and group action.48
In shorthand, we can therefore say that neoliberalism is market naturalizing and
market insulating, efficiency valorizing, power obscuring, and advances a view of both the
market-state and the citizen-consumer. Many of these features of neoliberalism can be
found in each of the procedural doctrines and areas that I analyze below, and all of
them are present in the overall schema of the new era of civil procedure. In addition,
we will see that civil procedure offers twists that deepen our understanding of the
dynamics of neoliberalism in modern American law.
II. NEOLIBERALISM IN PROCEDURAL DOCTRINE
Neoliberal hallmarks permeate the Supreme Court’s major procedural
decisions of the past generation. They are present in, among other things, the
Court’s summary judgment, pleading, arbitration, and class action decisions. This
Part is organized around these doctrinal areas, taking them in relative chronological
order, to show how multiple neoliberal hallmarks often exist within single areas and
how they interact and interrelate within those areas. While this Part focuses the
lion’s share of its attention on Supreme Court decisions, it also shows how
neoliberal hallmarks are evident in federal appellate procedural decisions, Supreme
Court and advisory committee procedural rulemaking, and federal legislation.
A. Summary Judgment
Neoliberalism perhaps first came to civil procedure in the summary judgment
context. Summary judgment is often the last significant gateway before trial.
Historically, motions for summary judgment had been granted somewhat
sparingly.49 In a series of 1986 decisions, often referred to as the summary judgment
45. See Grewal & Purdy, supra note 16, at 13–14.
46. See, e.g., Zephyr Teachout, Neoliberal Political Law, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4,
2014, at 215, 230–32.
47. Dinner, supra note 25, at 1062, 1066–67.
48. Alstott, supra note 27, at 26.
49. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary
Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 77 (1990) (“From its inception, federal judges treated summary judgment
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“trilogy,” the Supreme Court reinterpreted Rule 56, which governs summary
judgment in federal court, in a manner some of the drafters of the Rule view as
judicially rewriting it.50 Whether this is the case or not, the cases turned the tide
towards neoliberalism. This is especially so with Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.51 There, the Supreme Court put itself—and future
courts—in a position to judge the plausibility of claims at the summary judgment
stage in the antitrust context, and it constructed what is plausible within the
marketplace through the lens of efficiency-focused, Chicago-school economic
theory about how rational, profit-maximizing firms act. Along the way, it made the
procedural burden more difficult for plaintiffs charged with enforcing antitrust
law, thereby putting judges in a position to insulate the market from
regulatory litigation.52
1. Market-Naturalization
Matsushita is perhaps the zenith of procedural interpretation that is market
naturalizing, allowing judges to bring economic theory into their decision-making
to construct market rationality. U.S. television manufacturers brought an action
against Japanese and Japanese-owned U.S. television manufacturers, alleging that
they conspired in violation of the Sherman Act and other federal statutes to drive
the U.S. firms out of the market by maintaining artificially high prices in Japan and
low prices in the United States.53 The defendants moved for summary judgment.54
Under Rule 56, summary judgment should be granted if there is no “genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”55
Summary judgment had historically been used sparingly, especially in antitrust cases
where complex questions of motive are often involved.56 The Court in Matsushita,
however, decided that judges in deciding such motions must ask whether the
plaintiff’s claim is “plausible”—that is, whether it makes “economic sense.”57
warily, perceiving it as threatening a denial of such fundamental guarantees as the right to confront
witnesses, the right of the jury to make inferences and determinations of credibility, and the right to
have one’s cause advocated by counsel before a jury.”).
50. Miller, supra note 8, at 310–11 (“My successor as Reporter to the Rules Advisory
Committee—and others—share my view that the Court in essence was unilaterally ‘rewriting’ Rule 56
in these cases.”); see also Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on
Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 646 (2010).
51. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
52. See generally James F. Ponsoldt & Marc J. Lewyn, Judicial Activism, Economic Theory and the
Role of Summary Judgment in Sherman Act Conspiracy Cases: The Illogic of Matsushita, 33 ANTITRUST
BULL. 575 (1988).
53. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 577–78.
54. Id. at 578.
55. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
56. See, e.g., Poller v. CBS, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962) (“[ S ]ummary procedures should be
used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is
largely in the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot.”); see also Ponsoldt
& Lewyn, supra note 52, at 577–78, 591–92.
57. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
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Whether this requirement was a departure from the existing summary
judgment framework or a clarification of it is beside the point for present
purposes.58 What matters is that the Court required itself and future judges to reason
about what is plausible within the market—to opine on what made economic sense
in one market or another and, from that vantage, judge whether there was a genuine
issue of material fact for trial—and the Court constructed “economic sense”
through the prism of Chicago-school, neoclassical, efficiency-focused economic
theory.59 In so doing, it used plausibility analysis as a gateway for naturalizing the
defendants’ market behavior and disposing of the case before trial, cutting off
regulatory litigation.
Drawing on the work of law and economics scholars, the majority first
maintained that predatory pricing conspiracies such as the one alleged in the case
were speculative, uncertain to succeed by nature, and unlikely to be undertaken by
efficient firms focused on profit maximization.60 The Court therefore reasoned that
such schemes are rare—and doubly rare, as in the case, where they involve several
firms and the chance of achieving monopoly power is slight.61 The Court filled
three pages of the Federal Reports with economic theory casting doubt on the
plaintiffs’ claims with only passing reference to the record evidence in the
case—notable in a summary judgment opinion, where the record is the game—and
instead cited and quoted at length from the academic works of law and economics
scholars and economists to posit that as rational market actors defendants would
not act in the way plaintiffs alleged they had.62 The Court, whether properly
interpreting Rule 56 or not, had in one move elevated itself to construct the
plausibility of the particular market behavior of the firms in the case and in the next
move constructed market rationality with only passing reference to the record
evidence demonstrating the firms’ behavior and suggesting their motivations.63
Plausibility was a gateway for constructing a neoliberal view of the market.64
When the Court next turned to weighing whether the evidence tended to
exclude the possibility that the manufacturers acted independently, economic theory
58. The four dissenters believed the case departed from traditional summary judgment
standards and aggrandized the role of the judge in summary proceedings. Id. at 601 (White,
J., dissenting).
59. For an overview of how this thinking came to infuse antitrust law generally, see generally
George L. Priest, Bork’s Strategy and the Influence of the Chicago School on Modern Antitrust Law,
57 J.L. & ECON. S1 (2014).
60. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588–89.
61. Id. at 589–92.
62. See id. (citing and quoting from Robert Bork, John McGee, Frank Easterbrook, and others).
63. In this way, the case has been argued to “reverse[ ] the traditional inductive process by which
juries have always been instructed to proceed—from empirical data to ultimate fact.” Eugene Crew,
Matsushita v. Zenith: The Chicago School Teaches the Supreme Court a Dubious Lesson, ANTITRUST, Fall
1986, at 11, 11.
64. See Edward Brunet, The Substantive Origins of “Plausible Pleadings”: An Introduction to the
Symposium on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2010) (“As used here, the word
implausible appears to be unbelievable in economic theory, seemingly a substantive use of plausible
lacking a connection to specific pre-trial motions.”).
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was put at war with the evidence in the case. The Court first presented the aggregate
evidence that the defendants made certain pricing and market entrance agreements
that several of plaintiffs’ experts opined were designed to drive U.S. firms from the
market.65 The Court dismissed these opinions by returning back to Chicago-school
economic theory: “[C]utting prices in order to increase business is the very essence
of competition.”66 The plaintiffs’ allegations that this aggregate behavior could
constitute evidence of conspiracy was a “mistaken inference” that could, if taken
seriously, “chill” competitive market conduct.67 The Court then reasoned
that “economic realities”—again, citing to the theory of Chicago-school
theorists—“tend to make predatory pricing conspiracies self-deterring.”68 The
Court maintained this in the face of the history of antitrust law, where economic
behavior has often not conformed to such rigid theory about profit maximization
and where such “self-deterring” conspiracies had been proved.69 But in light of its
view of rational market behavior developed from efficiency-based theory, the Court
determined that there was no “rational motive to conspire” based on this record
evidence and that the conduct was not sufficient to create a genuine issue for trial.70
The dissenters maintained that the Court’s reliance on economic theory to
construct plausibility “invade[d] the factfinder’s province.”71 This was so in part
because the plaintiffs had five experts who thought the conspiracy was plausible.72
The Court’s efficiency-focused approach ignored these explanations because they
did not fit within the profit-maximizing frame. The dissenters stressed in particular
how the Court’s economic theorizing ignored a strong and detailed expert report
on the nature and rationale of the alleged conspiracy and the various ways it harmed
the plaintiffs,73 which painted a very different picture of the defendants’
motivations.74 It reasoned that the firms, in engaging in below-cost pricing in the
United States, may have been motivated less by profit maximization than by a desire
to create a market share large enough to achieve full employment for Japanese

65. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 594–96.
66. Id. at 594.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 595.
69. Id.; see also Crew, supra note 63, at 12 (arguing that economic behavior does not always follow
rationality can be justified by “political, social, religious, historical, emotional or other motivation[ s ]”);
Christopher R. Leslie, Rationality Analysis in Antitrust, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 313–14 (2010)
(“Corporate decisionmakers may undertake projects that seem irrational in hindsight but appeared
potentially profit maximizing when the firm made the decision. After the fact, judges may not be
particularly good arbiters of what constitutes rational ex ante business decision[ - ]making.”).
70. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597.
71. Id. at 599 (White, J., dissenting).
72. See id. at 601; Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1137
(E.D. Pa. 1981) (discussing the five expert opinions).
73. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 601–02.
74. Id.
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workers.75 What the majority thought was implausible from a theoretical
profit-maximizing perspective, the report maintained, actually made sense if one
understood the motivations and goals of the Japanese and Japanese-owned firms.
The dissenters thought the report, along with the other reports, created a genuine
factual issue regarding the alleged conspiracy.76 “No doubt,” Justice White wrote
for the four dissenters, “the Court prefers its own economic theorizing to [the
expert reports], but that is not a reason to deny the factfinder an opportunity
to consider [the experts’] views on how petitioners’ alleged collusion
harmed respondents.”77
In relying on efficiency-based economic theory to keep the case from going
to a jury, the Court, as James Ponsoldt and Marc Lewyn have argued, “substitute[d]
the deductive assumptions of neoclassical economic theory for record evidence.”78
And, as we shall see when I turn to pleadings and motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim in the following Section, Matsushita is part of a larger architecture where
the Court layers plausibility onto procedural analysis and construes plausibility in
ways that rationalize market behavior and make it more difficult for plaintiffs to
pursue regulatory claims.
2. Market-Insulation
Matsushita did not stand alone. The other cases of the term, Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett79 and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,80 combined with Matsushita,
pave the way towards a pro-defendant turn in civil procedure that made it more
difficult for plaintiffs to pursue regulatory claims. It is therefore worth exploring
the net effects of the other cases of the trilogy briefly. While the other cases are less
neoliberal in their doctrinal rationales, they contribute to a tightening on regulatory
lawsuits. Both Anderson and Celotex made summary judgment motions easier for
defendants to win and more difficult for plaintiffs to survive.81 Anderson did so by
investing district court judges with more discretion to assess the plausibility of a
claim, instructing judges to look at the record and ask whether the evidence is so
“one-sided,” favoring the defendant, that summary judgment should be granted.82
75. E.g., Leslie, supra note 69, at 292–93; Ponsoldt & Lewyn, supra note 52, at 577 n.8; Jeffrey
W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court’s Shimmering View of Summary Judgment, Directed
Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 108–09 (1988).
76. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 603.
77. Id.
78. Ponsoldt & Lewyn, supra note 52, at 577; see also William H. Page, Pleading, Discovery, and
Proof of Sherman Act Agreements: Harmonizing Twombly and Matsushita, 82 ANTITRUST L.J. 123, 130
(2018) (“Matsushita’s standard of the sufficiency of the evidence has permitted Courts to import
economic models and ideology into the resolution of antitrust cases.”).
79. 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
80. 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
81. See Miller, supra note 8, at 310–11.
82. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. As the dissenters argued, the decision is “an invitation—if not
an instruction—to trial courts to assess and weigh evidence much as a juror would.” Id. at 266 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
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Celotex made it easier for defendants to bring summary judgment motions without
putting forward evidence negating plaintiffs’ claims.83
Together, the cases made it easier for defendants to bring summary judgment
motions, more difficult for plaintiffs to survive them, and augmented judges’
interpretive authority in deciding the motions. The cases together were pushed for
by corporate lawyers and scholars, and particularly efficiency-focused economists,
who sought to have fewer cases go to trial.84 By placing judges as increasingly
empowered hurdles between plaintiffs and trial or settlement, they “transformed
summary judgment from an infrequently granted procedural device to a powerful
tool for the early resolution of litigation.”85 Indeed, since the trilogy was decided,
scholars have argued that federal judges have disposed of an increasing number of
regulatory cases at the summary judgment stage that would have previously gone to
trial.86 In the words of Arthur Miller, one of the former rule-makers himself,
summary judgment has since come to have “an Armageddon-like significance; it
has become both the centerpiece and end-point for many (perhaps too many)
federal civil cases.”87 And its effects have favored defendants so much that one
scholar argues that the doctrine has become patently pro-defendant.88
B. Pleading
In the pleading context, plausibility once again became a mechanism for judges
to use procedural interpretation to construct market rationality and insulate the
market from democratic control—but, remarkably, without the benefit of
depositions, expert reports, signed answers, and other materials apart from the
complaint. To make this leap, the Court, more forcefully and clearly than in the
summary judgment context, relied on efficiency rationales and obscured historical
power considerations.
In the pleading context, the Court has also employed an efficiency rationale
that deviates from how efficiency has long been understood in procedural
decision-making. And in its decisions, the Court both obscures and constructs
power. The Court obscures the power dynamics involved where often low- and
middle-income consumers must enforce regulatory laws against large firms. And it

83. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–27 (holding that the defendant seeking summary judgment on
plaintiff’s claims on the basis that the plaintiff lacked evidence to prove them was not required to put
forward evidence negating those claims).
84. See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 524
(2007) (“Because summary judgment avoids the time and expense of trial, it also appeals to
commentators who prize efficiency.”).
85. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability
Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?,
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 984 (2003).
86. Miller, supra note 8, at 310.
87. Id. at 311.
88. See Bronsteen, supra note 84, at 539–43.
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flips the script: maintaining that the power is really in the hands of those
plaintiff-consumers, aided by the Rules.
1. Market Naturalization, Redux
As with summary judgment, historically motions to dismiss for failure to state
a claim were less significant to pretrial procedure. Under Rule 8, complaints need
only give the defendant notice of the claim and the grounds for relief sought, and
Rule 8 had long been construed to permit simplified notice pleading.89 But in 2007
in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, another antitrust case, the Court read atop Rule 8
a requirement of plausibility.90 Plausibility analysis here, as with summary judgment,
has become a way for judges to reason about what makes “economic sense” in
certain cases. In doing so, the Court has again constructed its own view of efficient
market rationality—although here, less aided by reliance on scholarly theory—and
used that view to naturalize market behavior and insulate it from
regulatory litigation.
In Twombly, consumers brought a putative class action alleging antitrust
violations by four telecommunications and internet carriers.91 The plaintiffs alleged
that the carriers agreed to prevent competition by new market entrants in their
respective markets and also agreed to refrain from competing with one another in
their markets.92 The case centered on what allegations would be sufficient regarding
the anticompetitive agreement for the plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. Rule 8 had long been understood by the Supreme Court and
rule-makers to establish a notice pleading regime.93 Under it, plaintiffs need only to
provide a “short and plain statement of the claim,” which would give defendants
notice of the claim and the grounds for relief.94 And the complaint would only be
dismissed if there were no set of facts that would allow plaintiffs to demonstrate an
anticompetitive agreement.95 Based on Rule 8 and the precedents construing it, the
Second Circuit held that the complaint, which alleged an agreement among the
carriers in violation of the Sherman Act, complied with Rule 8.96
However, the Court departed from the longstanding interpretation of Rule 8.
The majority held that plaintiffs needed to and failed to provide sufficient factual
89. See generally Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010); FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
90. 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
91. See id. at 546.
92. Id. at 550–51.
93. See, e.g., Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957) (“[ T ]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary,
all the Rules require is ‘a short and plain statement of the claim.’”); Miller, supra note 89, at 4–5
(describing the history of notice pleading).
94. FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
95. See Conley, 355 U.S. at 45–46 (“[ A ] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief.”).
96. See Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 118–19 (2d Cir. 2005).
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content in their complaint suggesting an anticompetitive agreement in order to
comply with Rule 8.97 An agreement needed not only to be conceivable based on
the allegations but also, now, plausible.98 To survive a motion to dismiss based on
the Sherman Act violations involved in the case, the Court concluded that Rule 8
“requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an
agreement was made” among the carriers, and “without that further circumstance
pointing toward a meeting of the minds, an account of a defendant’s commercial
efforts stays in neutral territory.”99 The Court wrote that the “practical significance”
of this interpretation of Rule 8 was that it constrained plaintiffs’ power to exact
resources—whether in discovery costs or settlement pressure—from defendants.100
As with summary judgment, the Court elevated itself and future courts to
construct market rationality at the pleading stage through plausibility analysis. But
pleading is different. Unlike summary judgment, at the pleading stage, courts engage
in plausibility analysis without having any record evidence with which to grapple.
Instead, the complaint is the whole game. Under the previous notice pleading
framework, as Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, the plaintiffs in the case
would have proceeded to (likely limited) discovery and the defendants’ answers,
sworn depositions, and the other materials gathered during discovery and the
pretrial process would have (at least theoretically) informed the district court at the
summary judgment stage as to the structure of the market, the behavior at hand and
its nature, and whether there was a triable question of agreement or conspiracy.101
Indeed, while Matsushita is mostly a foray into neoclassical economic theory, the
Court at least measured that theory against some record evidence.102 But with
Twombly, the Court inserted itself and future courts into reasoning about what was
plausible within the market and whether market relationships evinced
anticompetitive conduct at the pleading stage, without the benefit of these materials.
This empowered the Court and future courts to cut off regulatory litigation at an
earlier stage.
The decision ultimately became a warring battle about what was rational or
anticompetitive market behavior without the benefit of a developed record. The
plaintiffs, according to the majority, needed to include allegations that could be
“placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement.”103 The word
“context” is important: it draws on judges’ situational sense about what markets are
and how they function. The plaintiffs alleged that each carrier engaged in similar
conduct to prevent competition from new market participants in their regions, that
they communicated amongst themselves through industry group meetings, and

97. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57.
98. Id. at 570.
99. Id. at 556–57.
100. Id. at 557–58.
101. Id. at 572–73 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
102. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
103. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
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included the statement of one CEO that competing with one another would be
profitable but wouldn’t be “right.”104 The plaintiffs also alleged that the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 was intended and designed to encourage the
carriers to compete with one another by entering one another’s markets, an act that
would be in each defendant’s economic self-interest.105 The carriers did not enter
one another’s markets, and the plaintiffs argued that this evidence suggested an
agreement as well. Based on these facts and circumstances, the plaintiffs offered a
Gestaltian view of the corporate behavior at hand—thwarting new entrants in
parallel fashion and not competing with another, against a backdrop of
communication and a red-flag statement about competition not being “right”—that
could, they argued, plausibly suggest an agreement “when viewed in light of
common economic experience.”106
The Court’s first move was to disaggregate the behavior, parceling it into
separate pieces, then offering its own view of market rationality and common
economic experience as to each piece. Striking the plaintiffs’ conclusory statements
about an agreement having been reached, the Court analyzed separately the
behavior to thwart new market entrants and the decision of the carriers to not
compete with one another.107 With regard to thwarting new market entrants, the
Court maintained that the carriers’ behavior could just as easily have been the
natural action of each provider to retain its regional dominance.108 Resistance to
new market participants, the Court asserted, was as equally likely “the natural,
unilateral reaction” of each carrier.109 “[R]esisting competition is routine
market conduct.”110
The Court then turned—again, disaggregating—to the decision of the carriers
not to compete with one another. The Court again offered a different economic
interpretation: while this behavior “could very well signify illegal agreement,” it
could also just reflect that the carriers were keeping to historical practices of
“dominating [their] separate geographical segments of the market.”111 A “natural
explanation”—note the use of “natural” again, a word the majority uses five times
to describe the behavior of the carriers—for the lack of competition was that each
carrier was “sitting tight.”112 It is a “rational and competitive business strategy” for
the carriers to engage in similar conduct to thwart new market entrants into each
market; such behavior is “routine market conduct.”113

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 550–52.
See id. at 549.
Id. at 565.
See id. at 566.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 567–68.
Id. at 568.
Id. at 554.
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In each instance, the Court offered its own view of what was rational or natural
market behavior—and in a historically contingent and heavily regulated market that
may be less amenable to broad generalizations by courts at the pleading stage. Thus,
while the plaintiffs pointed to a variety of circumstances in toto suggesting an
agreement, the Court asserted its own view of market rationality, naturalizing each
piece of conduct based on its own economic “common sense” about how rational
firms act. As was the case in the summary judgment context, a certain view of
market rationality emerged that naturalized and legitimized existing practices. As
Edward Purcell puts it, “[B]oth Matsushita and Twombly illustrate the conservative
majority’s faith in the benevolence of the ‘free market’ and ‘rational’ market
behavior.”114 And in both, plausibility was constructed around the “assumption that
free market actors would not behave in an economically ‘irrational’—and therefore
unlawful—manner.”115 Rationality corresponded not with the historical behavioral
practices of the firms but instead with neoclassical ideals about efficiency and profit
maximization, which were here somewhat awkwardly employed to rationalize both
carrier decisions to thwart new market entrants in their respective areas and not to
compete with one another.
In scrapping notice pleading, the majority thus authorized itself, in the words
of Justice Stevens, to “engag[e] in armchair economics at the pleading stage,”
unconstrained by the context-specific materials produced through discovery.116
“[T]he unfortunate result of the majority’s new pleading rule,” he continued, “will
be to invite lawyers’ debates over economic theory to conclusively resolve antitrust
suits in the absence of any evidence.”117
2. Power
The majority’s view of power is also neoliberal. Gone from the decision is the
historical solicitude the Court has paid to consumers and small businesses who must
enforce antitrust law, often against large firms, in order to fulfill important public
purposes.118 The Twombly majority, indeed, did not just obscure the aspects of
power entailed in a system that asks citizens as private enforcers to regulate large
and well-resourced firms. It also flipped the script and focused on the power of
plaintiffs and their threat to corporate defendants. The majority worried that
antitrust plaintiffs with groundless claims would take up the time and resources of
corporate defendants, extracting their resources with costly discovery and

114. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., From the Particular to the General: Three Federal Rules and the
Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1731, 1754 (2014).
115. Id. at 1755.
116. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 587.
117. Id. at 595.
118. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 89, at 16 (arguing that the Court’s pleading decisions “increase
the burden on under-resourced plaintiffs who typically contest with industrial and governmental
Goliaths in cases in which critical information is largely in the hands of defendants and is unobtainable
without access to discovery”).
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settlement pressures.119 The Court’s framing of the plaintiffs’ power is difficult not
to be overwhelmed by: the majority wrote that the plaintiffs composed over ninety
percent of all subscribers in the United States, in an action that would require
discovery “generating reams and gigabytes of business records” for antitrust
violations occurring over nearly a decade.120 But stop and flip the sentence: if
plaintiffs’ allegations are correct, carriers conducted illegal activity for nearly a
decade, affecting over ninety percent of U.S. subscribers, and the fact that
uncovering such conduct requires searching their business records is part of the cost
of remedying systemic misconduct. There is some peculiarity in naturalizing a
market where four carriers service ninety percent of consumers and then balking at
the enforcement costs of having consumers conduct discovery against such
powerful carriers when wrongdoing is alleged.
In this vein, Justice Stevens’ dissent observed how the focus on the power of
plaintiffs obscured how the decision transferred power to defendants. As I
mentioned above, the executives in this case were not only freed of the obligation
to provide sworn depositions or other limited discovery; they also were not even
required to file an answer denying the claims in the complaint.121 The majority’s
ruling thus “permit[ted] immediate dismissal based on the assurances of company
lawyers that nothing untoward was afoot.”122 Under the previous notice pleading
framework, the company and its executives would have had to have spoken. This
power shift was all the more remarkable because the regulatory system places
enforcement responsibility on consumers where essential information is in the
hands of defendants.123 Congress had authorized treble damages under the Sherman
Act to “encourage, rather than discourage, private enforcement of the law”—a feat
made more difficult by the Court’s decisions.124
In the pleading context and others below, the Court thus offers a twist on
power obscuring. As here, the Court often decides procedural cases involving, on
one side, low- or middle-income workers and consumers or small businesses, and
on the other, large multinational corporations. Davids often go up against
Goliaths.125 Furthermore, our regulatory system relies on Davids to enforce
regulation by making private rights of action central to regulatory enforcement.126
The Court, however, consistently ignores these aspects of power, structure, and
119. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–59.
120. Id. at 559.
121. See id. at 572–73 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 572.
123. See id. at 586 (noting that the case is a “poor vehicle for the Court’s new pleading rule, for
we have observed that ‘in antitrust cases, where “the proof is largely in the hands of the alleged
conspirators,” . . . dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff ample opportunity for discovery should be
granted very sparingly’”).
124. Id. at 587.
125. See, e.g., ALEXANDRA D. LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION 88–93 (2017) (exploring
resource disparities in litigation); Denise S. Owens, The Reality of Pro Se Representation,
82 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 147, 147–159 (2013).
126. See generally BURBANK & FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT, supra note 12.
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vulnerability. But it focuses on another: the power of those plaintiffs and the
vulnerability of corporate defendants. The well-resourced must suffer laborious
processes triggered by plaintiffs with often meritless claims who are aided by the
Rules. In this way, the Court both obscures and constructs power.
3. Efficiency
The decision is also neoliberal in the way it conceives of costs and
inefficiencies. The specter of discovery and forced settlement hangs over the
opinion, as the Court worries about the inefficient costs of litigation.127 Nowhere is
the analysis calibrated to the power of the defendants and the nature of the
case—a complex case against large organizational defendants with considerable
resources. The Court several times alluded to the expense of discovery in antitrust
cases and to the pressures for settlement.128 It relied on and quoted extensively from
an article by Judge Easterbrook arguing that discovery is a form of abuse, as well as
other economic analyses that focus on plaintiffs’ power in class action litigation.129
And the majority expressed skepticism that judges could control discovery run
amok. Plaintiffs in antitrust suits with “anemic” cases can use “the threat of
discovery expense [to] push cost-conscious defendants to settle” and to punish
others who are less cost conscious.130
The majority opinion reads in this respect like a defendant’s brief; no balance
or consideration of the overall power structure is attempted, nor is there
consideration of the benefits of antitrust suits to the public. No attention, either, is
paid to the considerable evidence that discovery costs are generally low, and where
they are high, they are frequently pegged to large cases and institutional
defendants.131 As Arthur Miller puts it, “Twombly’s emphasis on the defendant’s
costs . . . reveals how one-sided the discussions about expense and the expressions
of concern have become.”132 Contrast this picture of the state of affairs with the
one offered by Justice Stevens’s dissent. Justice Stevens reflected on how the
antitrust defendants who bear discovery costs “are some of the wealthiest
corporations in the economy” who have pushed the defense bar to limit discovery,

127. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–58.
128. See id.
129. See id. at 558–59 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635,
638 (1989) and William H. Wagener, Note, Modeling the Effect of One-Way Fee Shifting on Discovery
Abuse in Private Antitrust Litigation, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1887, 1898–99 (2003)). For a different view of
discovery founded in democratic regulatory theory, see generally Diego A. Zambrano, Discovery as
Regulation, 119 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2020).
130. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.
131. See infra note 315 and accompanying text. Nor is there an effort to consider the various
values associated with discovery beyond efficiency. See, e.g., Seth Katsuya Endo, Discovery Hydraulics,
52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1317, 1322 (2019) (exploring the relationship between discovery and procedural
justice norms of accuracy, efficiency, and participation); Zambrano, supra note 129 (exploring the
relationship between discovery and regulatory goals).
132. Miller, supra note 89, at 61.
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using anecdotal evidence that the Court accepts.133 It is “no surprise that the
antitrust bar” should push for this outcome, he added, “but we must recall that their
primary responsibility is to win cases for their clients, not to improve law
administration for the public.”134
As with its analysis of power, the Court’s analysis of efficiency—both in
Twombly and, as we shall see, elsewhere—also adds a twist. As we saw above, the
Court’s efficiency analysis is deeply linked to defendants’ discovery costs. This is a
departure from efficiency as it has traditionally been understood in procedure, and
it evinces another way that neoliberal civil procedure is different. Efficiency has
traditionally had a distinctive meaning in procedure. Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure says that the Rules should be construed “to secure the just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”135 And efficiency
has, since the Rules came into their modern form in 1938, been about ensuring that
procedure is not used as a sporting device that interferes with courts resolving
claims on the merits.136 In this way, procedural efficiency has been at least
tangentially tied to how efficiency is understood generally. Procedural efficiency ties
to economic efficiency’s focus on preference maximization by ensuring that judicial
processes do not excessively or unnecessarily sap resources and exact costs on
parties; by reducing cost and delay, efficiency enables parties to resolve their claims
without waste.137 But reducing costs has never been the sole focus of efficiency
analysis. Instead, the endeavor has been to “balance between the need to efficiently
administer the civil justice system and to fairly adjudicate litigant claims.”138
Efficiency therefore “meant reaching a result with the least amount of
administrative obfuscation.”139 Thus, one would look at the nature of the case and
tag the efficiency of the procedure to the extent to which it most simply enabled
the parties to resolve their dispute on the merits. Costs and justice needed to align.
The Supreme Court, as we see in Twombly and will see elsewhere, has
increasingly not viewed efficiency this way. As Brooke Coleman has shown, its
efficiency analysis is just about reducing costs.140 There is no effort to
“contextualize the cost by valuing and evaluating the benefits of the litigation. This
shows the widespread belief that efficiency is achieved when reform makes
litigation cheaper—without regard to other kinds of costs.”141 The Court therefore
133. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 596 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 595 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
136. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 89, at 3–4 (connecting the Rules to speedy resolution on
the merits).
137. See, e.g., D. Theodore Rave, Note, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary Judgment,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 877–78 (2006) (linking efficiency to, among other things, reducing delay).
138. Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777, 1787 (2015).
139. Id. at 1788.
140. Id. (“The current focus shifted, it appears, to reaching a result as cheaply as possible. In
other words, a premium is placed on assessing the raw cost of each litigation moment without much
regard for other potentially more nuanced costs that should be considered.”).
141. Id. at 1790.
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obscures other considerations, such as how the costs scale to the case and harm at
hand or what costs the plaintiffs bear in light of the decision, including by not being
able to bring their suit, and what costs the public may also bear as a result.142
Efficiency in leading Supreme Court procedural decisions has increasingly become
about reducing corporate defendants’ costs.
4. Iqbal and Efficiency
When Ashcroft v. Iqbal was decided a few years later, Twombly’s interpretation
of Rule 8 was extended more broadly beyond the antitrust context, protecting the
government—and in particular, the FBI and high-level government officials—from
the burdens of fact-gathering and discovery.143 Javaid Iqbal brought an action
against government officials, claiming that they violated his constitutional rights
while arresting and detaining him in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks.144 The Court extended its plausibility standard from Twombly.145
While Iqbal is a case about government power and therefore less relevant to my
claims about neoliberal procedure and market arrangements, arguments about the
excesses of discovery and the costs of litigation permeated the decision and once
again were not calibrated to the resources of the institutional defendant—here, the
U.S. government—or the purposes of having citizens vindicate important
rights—here, constitutional rights.146 Litigation, the Court wrote, “exacts heavy
costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources that
might otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the work of the
Government.”147 Courts are expensive, and the government, the majority reminded,
is otherwise busy “responding to . . . a national and international security emergency
unprecedented in the history of the American Republic.”148 Let us forget that for
Mr. Iqbal, the proper work of government might be not violating constitutional
rights and being held to account when it does.149
Justice Souter, who wrote the majority decision in Twombly, was now in a
flipped position as the lead dissenter, arguing that the assertions in Mr. Iqbal’s
complaint met the bar the majority had erected in Twombly.150 His framing of
Twombly in his dissent, however, betrayed the case’s neoliberal alignment. He
explained that in Twombly, the “difficulty was that the conduct alleged was
consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of rational
and competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of
142. See id. at 1788–93.
143. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684–85 (2009).
144. Id. at 666–70.
145. Id. at 677–82.
146. See id. at 685–86.
147. Id. at 685.
148. Id. (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 179 (2d Cir. 2007) (Cabranes, J., concurring)).
149. For an in-depth exploration of the case, see generally Shirin Sinnar, The Lost Story of Iqbal,
105 GEO. L.J. 379 (2017).
150. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 695–98 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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the market.”151 Those common perceptions, of course, were based not on discovery
materials, expert reports about the market, or sworn statements, but on the
pleadings and briefs alone. And they were common to the majority—as well as some
economic theorists—but not the plaintiffs or the dissenters. Whatever solicitude
the dissent showed for Mr. Iqbal’s terrible plight, Twombly’s focus on the discovery
costs and burdens for institutional defendants was now too baked into the Court’s
procedural decisions to resist. Costs, burdens of discovery, settlement pressures,
and vaguely defined inefficiencies drowned out other—reading the majority
opinions, one might ask, what other?—values.
C. Arbitration
Over the past few decades, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) so as to allow corporations to push much of American
regulatory and other litigation into private fora.152 The Court’s arbitration decisions
feature several neoliberal hallmarks: they construct an image of the market-state and
citizen-consumer, obscure power, and valorize a certain view of efficiency. As
arbitration clauses grow at a breakneck pace across core sectors of the economy,
our neoliberal arbitration law undermines both the ability of plaintiffs to enforce
federal regulatory law and the role of courts and judicial precedent in our
legal system.153
1. Power, Citizen-Consumers, and the Market-State
The origins of neoliberal arbitration law can be traced to Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.154 The case involved an arbitration clause
between two foreign corporations. One corporation sought to litigate claims
between the parties in federal district court rather than in arbitration in part because
the lawsuit asserted antitrust claims under the Sherman Act.155 It relied on the fact
that the arbitration clause did not explicitly encompass Sherman Act claims—or
claims arising under federal statutes generally—as well as the history of federal
courts uniformly holding that federal antitrust rights of action were “of a character
inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration.”156 The other party sought to resolve
the claims in international arbitration, arguing that the arbitration clause, while not
explicitly referencing Sherman Act claims, was general enough to encompass
151. Id. at 696 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007)).
152. For accounts of the rise and pervasiveness of arbitration, see generally Myriam Gilles, The
Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 371; J. Maria Glover,
Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052 (2015); Norris, supra note
14; Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and
the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2869–70 (2015).
153. For an overview of the growth of arbitration clauses in banking, employment, credit, and
other areas, see Norris, supra note 14, at 17–18.
154. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
155. Id. at 616–20.
156. Id. at 621.
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them.157 As a case about international arbitration, Mitsubishi did not speak directly
to the domestic arbitration at the center of the FAA, but its logic would be returned
to over the following decades to shape domestic arbitration law in
neoliberal fashion.
The Court’s first move was to expand the reach of general arbitration clauses
to encompass federal statutory rights of action.158 The Supreme Court and federal
courts had before declined in a variety of circumstances to enforce arbitration
clauses involving federal statutes.159 For example, in Wilko v. Swan, the Court
declined to enforce an arbitration clause in a claim arising under the Securities Act
of 1933, maintaining that the statute “was drafted with an eye to the disadvantages
under which buyers [of securities] labor” and that arbitration would only exacerbate
those disadvantages for buyer-plaintiffs because arbitral awards “may be made
without explanation of their reasons and without a complete record of their
proceedings.”160 Arbitral proceedings would deprive plaintiffs of understanding or
challenging “arbitrators’ conception of the legal meaning of [the] statutory
requirements.”161 Previous arbitration decisions both evinced a sensitivity to power
dynamics and a robust view of the importance of public procedures in vindicating
statutory rights.
The Court got around Soler Corporation’s argument by relying on the “liberal
policy favoring arbitration agreements” it had announced two years before in Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.162 In that case, the Court
had determined “that questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy
regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration.”163 And it announced that any
“doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration.”164 In light of this language, the Court in Mitsubishi concluded that while
the parties did not explicitly reference federal rights of action, their intentions would
be “generously construed as to issues of arbitrability,” and therefore, the general
clause would be construed to cover arbitration of the cause of action under the
Sherman Act.165
The decision is not only notable for its presumption that arbitration clauses
would cover statutory causes of action in light of a history of courts shielding many
such causes of action from arbitration.166 The Court also began to paint a picture of
157. Id. at 616.
158. Id. at 625–29.
159. See, e.g., id. at 650 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[ T ]he Court has repeatedly held that a decision
by Congress to create a special statutory remedy renders a private agreement to arbitrate a federal
statutory claim unenforceable.”).
160. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435–36 (1953).
161. Id.
162. 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 24–25.
165. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985).
166. See generally Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (involving arbitration
and a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Barrentine v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., Inc.,
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arbitration and private ordering much different from the one it had before. In the
Court’s previous arbitration decisions, federal courts were viewed as institutions that
equalized power through procedure and developed regulatory law through public
process and precedents.167 Not so here. There is no reason, the Court said, to depart
from favoring arbitration when the claims raised are founded on statutory rights
because “[w]e are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of
arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development
of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.”168 Erasing concerns
about power and parity, the Court reasoned that a party whose arbitration
agreement is construed to encompass statutory rights of action does “not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an
arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”169
The Court then began to flip the script: valorizing nimble private ordering and
contrasting it with onerous public ordering.170 As the Court decided to enforce the
agreement to arbitrate,171 it described how arbitration offered “adaptability” and
“streamlined proceedings” with “expeditious results” that made it well-suited for
resolving even complicated antitrust claims.172 A party who proceeds in arbitration,
the Court wrote, can pursue their claim in a forum that is, unlike federal courts,
characterized by “simplicity, informality, and expedition.”173 The Court, in these
passages, erased the concerns that animated its previous decisions about power
disparities, the benefits of public procedural protections, and the importance of
public legal and regulatory development.174 Courts and their procedures came to be
450 U.S. 728 (1981) (involving arbitration and a wage claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act);
McDonald v. City of W. Branch, Mich., 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (discussing arbitration’s interaction with
principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel); Wilko, 346 U.S. 427 (involving arbitration and a claim
under the Securities Act of 1933).
167. For explorations of how courts are democratic sites that develop public values, see generally
LAHAV, supra note 125; Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); David Luban,
Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619 (1995); Judith Resnik, Courts: In and
Out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 804 (2008).
168. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626–27.
169. Id. at 628.
170. In the decision and others to come, the Court would paint a picture of arbitration as
offering an efficient forum as compared to courts, without considering either empirical data on
arbitration’s costs or on whether plaintiffs can or do pursue their regulatory claims in the forum. Among
other things, the data show that parties who litigate are less likely to arbitrate in part because
they have more difficulty finding lawyers to represent them in arbitration. See KATHERINE
V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., BRIEFING PAPER: THE ARBITRATION
EPIDEMIC, BRIEFING PAPER NO. 414, at 21–22 (2015), https://www.epi.org/files/2015/
arbitration-epidemic.pdf [ https://perma.cc/A7Y4-CLDA ].
171. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629. The Court here limited its enforcement to the fact that this
was an internal arbitration agreement where comity and respect for the capacities of international
tribunals, among other variables, justified enforcing the arbitration clause. Id.
172. Id. at 632–34.
173. Id. at 628.
174. See supra notes 159–161 and accompanying text. For explorations of how arbitration
threatens substantive law and the role of courts, see generally Resnik, supra note 152; Gilles, supra note
152; Glover, supra note 152.
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viewed through the lens of the market as less streamlined and efficient as private
processes. And the State’s role therefore was not to equalize power and build
regulatory law but to facilitate citizen-consumer choice and interest maximization
in dispute resolution. It was to facilitate parties in resolving disputes that involve
only themselves and their interests. Litigants are thus viewed as bilateral,
self-interested maximizers. Lost from view is whether the choice to arbitrate is
meaningful for plaintiffs, which it often is not.175
These shifts were not lost on the dissenters. Justice Stevens observed that this
was the first case in which the Court had enforced an arbitration agreement
involving anything other than a contract claim.176 He surveyed the Court’s cases
involving regulatory, statutory litigation—including suits adjudicating issues arising
under employment discrimination, securities, and labor laws.177 The cases were
driven by a recognition of the importance of public procedural protections for
plaintiffs seeking to enforce regulatory law, as well as a recognition of the
democratic value of giving judges rather than arbitrators “final authority to
implement federal statutory policy.”178 In previous cases, the Court had explicitly
stated that arbitrators are concerned with and equipped for effectuating the intent
of the parties, not for developing the “law of the land.”179 Justice Stevens also noted
how arbitration awards are “virtually unreviewable” and “need not be written or
published.”180 He referred to arbitration as a “[d]espotic decision[-]making” that is
suitable for contractual disputes but ill-suited to developing public law doctrine.181
And he argued that public proceedings were especially important in this case in light
of the nature of antitrust claims, which involved much more than bilateral dispute
resolution and went to the very stability and fairness of markets.182 Indeed, he noted
that because of the public importance of antitrust enforcement, antitrust plaintiffs
have long been analogized to private attorneys general.183
Two years later, in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, the Court
confronted domestic arbitration involving Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.184 Relying on and
expounding the logic in Mitsubishi, the Court stated that its duty to enforce
arbitration agreements is not diminished when a party bound by an agreement raises
175. Workers and consumers subjected to arbitration very often hardly comport with this vision
of active choice. The arbitration clauses commonly come in contracts of adhesion, and the process is
chosen and structured by the corporation. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 152, at 2869–70; Luke P. Norris,
The Parity Principle, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 249 (2018) (exploring power disparities in arbitration).
176. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 646 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 646–50.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 647–49.
180. Id. at 656–57.
181. Id. at 657.
182. Id. at 655–57 (“A claim under the antitrust laws is not merely a private matter.” (quoting
Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826–27 (2d Cir. 1968)).
183. Id. (citing Am. Safety Equip. Corp., 391 F.2d at 826–27).
184. 482 U.S. 220, 222 (1987).
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a claim founded on statutory rights.185 The Court signaled that federal statutory
rights were generally amenable to being submitted to arbitration.186 And it took aim
at its previous decisions’ “general suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and the
competence of arbitral tribunals,” stating that the Court had long moved past
these views.187
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun focused on the power disparities these
regulatory laws were designed to confront and even out, and he lamented the
Court’s idealized view of arbitration and failure to appreciate the benefits of public,
judicial process.188 As Justice Stevens had done in Mitsubishi, Justice Blackmun went
through the various features that distinguished arbitration from public adjudication
and the various power dynamics at play in the regulatory framework.189 He offered
a different view of the courts, their procedures, and how they interacted with
plaintiffs’ relative power and vulnerability.190 But the ship had already sailed.
2. Encroaching on Employment
The next terrain for expanding the sphere of private ordering would be
employment. If the Court’s reasoning broadly swept across regulatory statutes,
potentially keeping a wide swath of private enforcement litigation out of courts, it
hit a hurdle with federal statutes governing employment relations. Section 1 of the
FAA excludes from its command to enforce arbitration agreements those contained
in ‘‘contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce.’’191 The Court narrowly avoided the
hurdle in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.192 There, it considered whether a
claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act could be arbitrated.193 The
Court held that it could, and it avoided section 1 of the FAA because the parties
below had not raised the issue and the arbitration clause was not contained in the
actual contract of employment.194 One of the plaintiff’s reasons for why the
statutory framework was not amenable to arbitration had to do with unequal
bargaining power.195 The Court rejected the argument: “Mere inequality in

185. See id. at 226.
186. Some exclusions include contracts involving fraud or other grounds for the revocation or
where Congress provides a contrary command. See id. at 227–28.
187. Id. at 231–32.
188. Id. at 252–58 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). With regard to the Exchange Act, he observed
that the statute was designed to “protect investors from predatory behavior” and lamented how the
Court “effectively overrule[ d ]” its previous decisions protecting investors and ensuring they had the
benefits of federal procedural protections despite the fact that each day the “industry’s abuses towards
investors are more apparent than ever.” Id. at 243 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
189. See id. at 257–58.
190. See id.
191. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (emphasis added).
192. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
193. Id. at 23.
194. See id. at 34–36.
195. See id. at 32.
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bargaining power . . . is not a sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements
are never enforceable in the employment context.”196
Justice Stevens wrote the dissent, flagging just how far the Court had gone in
ignoring power considerations.197 He asserted that the FAA had excluded
arbitration agreements involving employers and employees precisely because of
unequal bargaining power and that there was “no reason to limit this exclusion from
coverage to arbitration clauses contained in agreements entitled ‘Contract of
Employment.’”198 Since the agreement to arbitrate arose out of the employment
agreement, Justice Stevens interpreted the FAA to direct courts not to enforce the
arbitration clause.199 He reflected on how the procedural decisions of the Court
construing the FAA had taken a long foray away from the statute’s original aims
and rationales: “When the FAA was passed in 1925, I doubt that any legislator who
voted for it expected it to apply to statutory claims, to form contracts between
parties of unequal bargaining power, or to the arbitration of disputes arising out of
the employment relationship.”200 The Court had, in its construal of the statute, “put
to one side any concern about the inequality of bargaining power between an entire
industry, on the one hand, and an individual customer or employee, on the other.”201
In Circuit City Stores v. Adams, the Court continued to be agnostic to
considerations of power, structure, and the equalizing force of public process when
it directly addressed the meaning of section 1 of the FAA.202 The Court construed
the section’s language as prohibiting federal courts only from enforcing arbitration
agreements involving transportation workers.203 Scholars have critiqued its statutory
interpretation in depth, arguing that the legislative history clearly evinces an intent
to prohibit the enforcement of arbitration clauses in federal court involving all
workers within Congress’s commerce clause authority.204 But for our present
purposes, what is more instructive is how the Court used its strained textualism to
ignore the questions of power and structure that animated the addition of section 1
to the statute. The legislative history of section 1 focused on disparities in bargaining
power and the power that employers would bring into arbitration, and based on the
structure of the employment relationship and those power disparities, it directed
federal courts not to enforce employment arbitration agreements.205 The Court did
196. Id. at 32–33.
197. Id. at 43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
198. Id. at 40.
199. See id.
200. Id. at 43.
201. Id. at 42–43.
202. 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
203. See id.
204. See Matthew W. Finkin, “Workers’ Contracts” Under the United States Arbitration Act: An
Essay in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 282, 298 (1996); Margaret L. Moses,
Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by
Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 106–08 (2006); Norris, supra note 175, at 272–89.
205. See Finkin, supra note 204, at 298; Moses, supra note 204, at 106–08; Norris, supra note 175,
at 272–89.
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not address these concerns. It replaced considerations of power and structure with
an exploration of the “real benefits” of arbitration in the employment
relationship.206 Arbitration, it affirmed again, is less costly and burdensome and
often more effective for parties than federal courts’ procedures.207
Justice Stevens again held the pen in dissent. He criticized how the Court’s
“refusal to look beyond the raw statutory text enable[d] it to disregard countervailing
considerations that were expressed by Members of the enacting Congress and that
remain valid today.”208 Justice Stevens posited that the case showed the wisdom of
the observation of Justice Aharon Barak of the Supreme Court of Israel that the
minimalist judge who maintains “that the purpose of the statute may be learned only
from its language has more discretion than the judge who will seek guidance from
every reliable source.”209 The Court’s method of statutory interpretation was
“deliberately uninformed, and hence unconstrained” and as such was able to
produce a result that may be “consistent with a court’s own views of how things
should be, but it may also defeat the very purpose for which a provision was
enacted.”210 Section 1, put otherwise, was all about power when it was drafted and
not at all about power when it was interpreted.
3. Individualized Citizen-Consumers
The Court has also conceived of arbitral efficiency as best being permitted by
bilateral arbitration and has placed a thumb on the scale against aggregate
proceedings. In this way, the Court’s decisions double down on neoliberalism’s
construal of citizen-consumers as individual preference maximizers and its
antagonism towards collective action.211
In Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp. in 2010, the Court
considered whether arbitration clauses that were silent on the issue of class
arbitration could be interpreted to permit it.212 In the case, the parties had agreed to
let the arbitration panel decide the question of whether class arbitration was a
permissible procedure, and the panel had decided that it was.213 The Court in
Stolt-Nielsen held that the panel’s decision was impermissible because class
arbitration was not a permissible inference from silence and needed to be explicitly

206. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 122–23.
207. See id.
208. Id. at 132–33.
209. Id. at 133 (quoting AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION 62 (Y. Kaufmann transl.,
Yale 1989)).
210. Id. at 132–33.
211. Hila Keren has also associated the Court’s anti-collective action arbitration decisions with
neoliberal thought. See Hila Keren, Divided and Conquered: The Neoliberal Roots and Emotional
Consequences of the Arbitration Revolution, 72 FLA. L. REV. 575, 606–16 (2020).
212. 559 U.S. 662, 666 (2010).
213. See id. at 672–73.
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referenced in the parties’ agreement.214 The Court reasoned that even an implicit
agreement to permit class arbitration was not one an arbitrator could infer in these
circumstances because the class form “changes the nature of arbitration.”215 For the
Court, individual arbitration is characterized by low costs and flexibility.216 These
benefits are “much less assured” in class arbitration, where the arbitrator must
resolve disputes between potentially thousands of parties.217
Justice Ginsburg wrote in dissent that the Court constructed its own logic
about how the class form changes the efficient nature of arbitration without
considering how the class form may be the only mechanism through which plaintiffs
wronged and subject to arbitration agreements may obtain relief.218 Aggregation was
not only power; it was potentially the only way to seek relief.219 In short, the Court’s
construal of what arbitration means—in the face of what the parties and arbitrators
themselves thought it could mean—effectively allowed it to put a thumb on the
scale against collective action and therefore against plaintiffs vindicating their rights.
The Court’s bent against aggregate dispute resolution came to the fore again
the next year in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.220 In the case, the Court
considered whether the FAA prohibited the application of California’s
unconscionability doctrine to an arbitration clause banning class arbitration.221 The
parties below had argued that the adhesion contract was unconscionable, and the
Ninth Circuit agreed and declined to enforce the agreement because it did not
permit class-wide arbitration.222 However, the Supreme Court concluded that the
FAA preempted the California doctrine. Justice Scalia wrote that “[r]equiring the
availability of classwide arbitration interferes with fundamental attributes of
arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”223 Class
arbitration interfered with the “streamlined” nature of arbitration and inserted
procedural formality, like that required in court, in its place.224 The Court thus
continued to valorize arbitration as an efficient sphere of private ordering, much
unlike public ordering.
The Court also continued to maintain a lopsided view of power and
vulnerability. Defendants’ vulnerability came to the center of the decision. Class
214. See id. at 684 (“[ A ] party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class
arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.”).
215. Id. at 685.
216. Id. at 684–86.
217. Id. at 685–86.
218. Id. at 699 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“When adjudication is costly and individual claims are
no more than modest in size, class proceedings may be ‘the thing,’ i.e., without them, potential claimants
will have little, if any, incentive to seek vindication of their rights.” (quoting Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997)).
219. Id.
220. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
221. See id. at 336–40.
222. See id. at 337–38.
223. Id. at 344.
224. Id. at 344–45.
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arbitration, Justice Scalia said, “greatly increases risks to defendants.”225 The cost of
errors in arbitration rose exponentially for defendants in class-wide arbitration
based on the size of the proceeding and the lack of ability to seek meaningful
appellate review, a fact that may cause defendants to settle.226 The Court’s
defendant-protective reasoning for finding the California doctrine to be preempted
is remarkable: for decades it had been extolling the virtues of arbitration and
arbitrators as compared to courts, but now it warned of arbitrators’ errors and about
how limited appellate rights for defendants may make it nearly impossible to correct
such errors in the context of aggregate arbitration. Plaintiffs must live with the risk
of error in arbitration, errors that may have serious and even catastrophic effects on
their personal lives and financial stability. Their vulnerability is nowhere in view in
recent arbitration decisions. But corporations, facing the same threats from
plaintiffs who have aggregated to try to match their power, must be protected from
such risk.
When the Court turned to the plaintiffs and the fact that individual arbitration
may defeat their claims, the air of solicitude was gone. To the extent that small-value
claims would not be brought if class arbitration were not available, the Court
reflected that the “States cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the
FAA, even if it is desirable for unrelated reasons.”227 Of course, as Justice Breyer
noted in his dissent, class arbitration had been widely used and viewed as consistent
with the statute and been used in part because of power dynamics: absent an
aggregation mechanism, plaintiffs with small-value claims would likely be required
to face off against AT&T without counsel.228
Finally, two years later in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the
Court’s individualistic view of arbitration and bent against collective action left
plaintiffs powerless and likely without relief once again.229 American Express
forbade class arbitration explicitly under its agreement with merchants.230 Italian
Colors, a restaurant, sought to bring an antitrust action against American Express,
and an expert opined that the cost of proceeding on its own in arbitration would
exceed any recovery the restaurant would receive by at least ten times.231 The Court
thus considered whether the class arbitration waiver was enforceable in these
circumstances. The majority concluded that the FAA did not preclude arbitration
225. Id. at 350.
226. See id.
227. Id. at 351.
228. See id. at 361–66 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He also noted the history of the statute
conditioning arbitration on “roughly equivalent bargaining power . . . [ which ] suggests, if anything, that
California’s statute is consistent with, and indeed may help to further, the objectives that Congress had
in mind.” Id.
229. 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
230. Id. at 231.
231. Id. at 231 (“[ R ]espondents submitted a declaration from an economist who estimated that
the cost of an expert analysis necessary to prove the antitrust claims would be ‘at least several hundred
thousand dollars, and might exceed $1 million,’ while the maximum recovery for an individual plaintiff
would be $12,850, or $38,549 when trebled.”).
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in these circumstances and that its previous decisions holding that federal statutory
rights of action could be arbitrated unless the party could not effectively vindicate
its rights in arbitration did not make the waiver unenforceable.232 The Court
reasoned that Italian Colors did not waive its right to pursue statutory remedies nor
were filing and administrative fees so high that access to the arbitral forum was
rendered impracticable.233 Quite simply, “the fact that it is not worth the expense
involved in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right
to pursue that remedy.”234
Justice Kagan’s dissent framed the power dynamics and whitewashed
choice-based reasoning differently. Italian Colors, she wrote, is a “small restaurant”
that thinks American Express “has used its monopoly power to force merchants to
accept a form contract violating the antitrust laws.”235 The arbitration clause to
which the restaurant is subject would make pursuing these claims “a fool’s errand”
in light of the costs of maintaining the suit alone.236 The result is that if the clause
were to be enforced, American Express “has insulated itself from antitrust
liability—even if it has in fact violated the law. The monopolist gets to use its
monopoly power to insist on a contract effectively depriving its victims of all legal
recourse.”237 The case, in short, was about power and its connection to collective
action. The majority’s refusal to see this meant that it fashioned arbitration not “as
a streamlined method of resolving disputes” but instead “as a foolproof way of
killing off valid claims.”238
And, indeed, Justice Kagan noted that the Court’s hostility to class arbitration
was likely influenced by its hostility to Rule 23 class actions in court—to which I
turn next. “To a hammer,” she wrote, “everything looks like a nail. And to a Court
bent on diminishing the usefulness of Rule 23, everything looks like a class action,
ready to be dismantled.”239 The Court was seemingly anti-aggregation wherever and
whenever it found it. The result was an ironic one in light of the Court’s precedents.
For all the Court has written about parties agreeing to arbitrate because the forum
offers streamlined and more efficient process, the Court increasingly envisioned
arbitration to make it less usable by plaintiffs who could best, and perhaps only,

232. See id. at 234–39.
233. See id. at 236 (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000)) (“It
may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant . . . from effectively
vindicating her federal statutory rights[ . ]”).
234. Id. at 236.
235. Id. at 240 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 244 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
481 (1989)).
239. Id. at 253–54. Pamela Bookman shows how the Court’s anti-litigation and pro-arbitration
orientations relate and how its anti-litigation posture sometimes wins out. See generally
Pamela K. Bookman, The Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1119 (2019).
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arbitrate successfully in aggregate form.240 The citizen-consumer, then, has a choice
so long as they have the means to go it alone.
D. Class Actions
In the class action context, procedural interpretation and rulemaking over the
past three decades have also demonstrated neoliberal hostility to collective action
and reified the baseline presumption that the citizen-consumer litigates alone, even
when facing mass harm. Procedure, in this way, has insulated corporate power from
the form of litigation that is best equipped to create an equal playing field, and in
some instances—such as where government enforcement authorities lack
information, resources, or will—best equipped among all options to enforce
regulatory law.241 The transformation of the class action is best described as death
by a thousand cuts. However gradual the transformation has been, a thread runs
through Supreme Court and federal decisions, procedural rulemaking, and federal
legislation: constructing a universe where the power is on the side of plaintiffs and
the constraints on corporate defendants; expressing skepticism of class settlement
because of plaintiff power; and presuming that litigation is bilateral and
collective, or aggregate action is an outlier, thus thwarting the ability of citizens to
litigate together.
1. Power
One early and influential example of neoliberal class action jurisprudence is
Judge Posner’s decision for the Seventh Circuit, In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.242
Rhone-Poulenc was a decision overturning a class certification. It was a mandamus
decision because the Rules did not then provide for interlocutory appeals of
certification decisions.243 The decision reversed the certification of a class in part
because the potential amount of a settlement or verdict would put “intense”
pressure on the defendants to settle.244 The court’s use of its equitable power was
thus said to be justified by “the sheer magnitude of the risk to which the class
action” exposed the defendants “in contrast to the individual actions pending or
likely.”245 While the defendants faced three hundred suits, with class certification,

240. Am. Express, 570 U.S. at 253 (“In the hands of today’s majority, arbitration threatens to
become . . . a mechanism easily made to block the vindication of meritorious federal claims and insulate
wrongdoers from liability.”). In light of these decisions, Hila Keren views the Court’s arbitration
decisions as evincing “a premeditated effort to undermine collectivity.” Keren, supra note 211, at 575.
241. E.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616, 631,
658 (2013); J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanism in Public Law,
53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137, 1155 (2012).
242. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
243. See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 732 (2013)
(“[ P ]rior to the adoption of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f) in 1998, defendants typically could
not seek immediate appellate review of an order granting class certification.”).
244. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d at 1298.
245. Id. at 1297.
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Judge Posner reasoned they could face a few thousand.246 In light of those numbers,
they “may not wish to roll these dice. That is putting it mildly. They will be under
intense pressure to settle.”247
This reasoning not only treats individual suits as the baseline in the context of
mass harm, but it also looks at settlement power only from the defendants’
perspective. From the perspective of the potentially thousands of plaintiffs allegedly
harmed by the defendants, the power to proceed as a class was likely the power to
obtain relief. And the sources that Judge Posner cited for his conclusion about
settlement pressure included academic articles by corporate lawyers and economists
decrying class actions and referring to them as legalized “blackmail.”248 Before
Rhone-Poulenc, the media and prominent Republicans had jumped on examples of
large class settlements and verdicts, with hefty fees for plaintiffs’ counsel, to
characterize the class action as a form of blackmail.249 The narrative—which was
always strained for broader empirical support250—was now gaining traction in the
federal courts. And, as with the examples of neoliberal civil procedure above, the
narrative obscured from view the power of corporate defendants and the resource
disparities often existing between them and the citizens our regulatory system
charges with bringing enforcement actions against them.
Soon after the decision, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules drafted
Rule 23(f).251 The Rule was designed to give both plaintiffs and defendants the
ability to appeal, respectively, class certification denials or grants, making the
exercise of mandamus power unnecessary.252 As the plaintiffs’ bar correctly
predicted, the Rule overwhelmingly protected defendants. In the decade and a half
after it was enacted, most appeals accepted and won were by defendants.253
Throughout decisions, the pressure plaintiffs whose classes were certified put on

246. Id. at 1297–98.
247. Id.
248. See id. One article he cited said that class action “is an area in which the labels ‘legalized
blackmail’ and ‘Frankenstein monster’ seem more appropriate than the extravagant praise of the Rule’s
enthusiasts.” William Simon, Class Actions—Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 375
(1972). Another said that class certification decisions “compel defendants to enter settlements on
favorable terms with hundreds and thousands of unimpaired claimants as a way of clearing courts’
dockets.” Lester Brickman, On the Relevance of the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: Tort System
Outcomes Are Principally Determined by Lawyers’ Rates of Return, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1755,
1780 (1994).
249. Klonoff, supra note 243, at 737–38.
250. See, e.g., Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, Exploding the Blackmail Myth: A New Perspective on
Class Action Settlements, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 681 (2005). For data on what class action settlements look
like and how they compare to settlements by public attorneys general, see BRIAN T. FITZPATRICK, THE
CONSERVATIVE CASE FOR CLASS ACTIONS 44–45 (2019); Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman,
Exploding the Class Action Agency Costs Myth: The Social Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 131–32 (2006).
251. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f); see also Klonoff, supra note 243, at 738–42 (exploring the relationship
between the decision and Rule 23(f)).
252. See Klonoff, supra note 243, at 739–41 (overviewing the history of the Rule).
253. See id. at 741–42 (collecting cases).
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defendants to settle has been a consistent factor.254 But the problem is that “[i]n
every case in which a class is certified, a defendant can argue as a ground for appeal
that it faces pressure to settle” and that courts of appeal “are in no position to
engage in case-specific factfinding necessary to gauge the true pressure on the
defendant.”255 Also, settlement pressure is arguably justified where there is mass
harm. These decisions are particularly one-sided when appellate courts write that
the certification decision is a “death knell” for defendants that will cause them to
settle.256 What is a death knell for corporate defendants is often relief for the
plaintiffs, especially if their claims about wrongdoing are correct—and indeed, the
class action is based on the premise that it may be the only relief most plaintiffs are
likely to receive because of the difficulties of individually prosecuting cases
involving broad or systemic harm and small-value relief.257
If Rule 23(f) empowered federal appellate courts to scrutinize class
certification decisions, the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 augmented federal
courts’ sphere of influence.258 The legislation broadly permitted the removal of class
actions from state to federal court, resulting in the shift of most class actions to
federal courts.259 The congressional record is full of statements about class actions
being extortionate and unfair mechanisms for plaintiffs to exact resources and about
state courts overreaching and federal courts being fairer and more neutral fora.260
The preamble to the legislation paints a picture of “abuses of the class action device”
involving extortionate settlements by lawyers.261 This narrative, like Judge Posner’s
statement, was not based on or supported by empirical data.262
But the one-sided narrative about plaintiffs’ power—and concomitant
obscuring of the power of defendants—stuck. With federal courts as the
near-exclusive domain of class actions, federal judges began imposing hurdle after
hurdle to class litigation, reflecting neoliberal impulses against collective action. In
a sweeping article, Robert Klonoff surveys federal district court and appellate
decisions that have turned the screws on class action litigation in a multitude of
ways: raising the evidentiary standards for district courts to certify class actions,

254. See id.
255. Id.
256. See id. at 740.
257. See id.; see also Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Mere pressure
to settle is not a sufficient reason for a court to avoid certifying an otherwise meritorious class
action suit.”).
258. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
259. See Klonoff, supra note 243, at 732.
260. See, e.g., id. at 743 (exploring the enactment history); see also S. REP. NO. 109–14, at 13–23
(2005); 151 CONG. REC. S1225, S1228 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 2005) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch); 151
CONG. REC. H723, H726 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 2005) (statement of Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner); 151
CONG. REC. S999–02, S999 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 2005) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter).
261. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.
262. See, e.g., FITZPATRICK, supra note 250 (discussing settlement data); Gilles & Friedman, supra
note 250 (same).

Clean Final Edit_Norris_v2.docx (Do Not Delete)

506

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

2/1/22 9:20 PM

[ Vol. 12:471

tightening the numerosity requirement and analysis, heightening the commonality
requirement of Rule 23(a), rejecting class certification because plaintiffs have not
pursued all conceivable claims, and rejecting class certification under Rule 23(b)(3)
because individual issues are involved (even without analyzing whether they
predominate), among other examples.263 Settlement pressure has become pervasive
in these decisions and has even risen to becoming a factor district courts “weigh in
the certification calculus.”264 Judges have also inserted themselves in a jury-like role
by deciding before certifying the class whether the weight of evidence favors the
plaintiff.265 Federal decisions reach across the class certification process and stand
in marked contrast with the class certification analyses that federal courts conducted
for the first few decades after the modern Rule 23 class action was put into place.
2. Individualized Citizen-Consumers
One core move that courts make is to disaggregate the class, focusing less on
collective harm and more on individual distinctions and due process concerns.
Thus, in its class action decisions the Supreme Court once again trains its eye on
the individual citizen-consumer and thwarts and dampens collective litigation.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes is a prime example.266 In the case, a putative
class of over a million and a half women alleged that Wal-Mart relied on gender
stereotypes in its promotion and pay decisions.267 The case was about whether the
threshold criteria of Rule 23(a)(2) was met—whether there were “questions of law
or fact common to the class.”268 The district court and Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, Breyer, and Kagan believed that the common question was whether
Wal-Mart’s pay and promotion policies were discriminatory.269 Justice Ginsburg,
writing for these justices, explored how the majority’s move was to elide the
common dispute in the case and to focus on dissimilarities among the plaintiffs.270
Its move was to thwart collective litigation by disaggregating the proposed class.
Rule 23(a)’s requirement of common questions of law or fact has long been
understood to be satisfied by a single common question.271 Only after that common
question is found does Rule 23(b) kick in, and plaintiffs must then satisfy one of its
263. See Klonoff, supra note 243, at 745–815.
264. See id. at 740; see also In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310
(3d Cir. 2008) (“[ Settlement pressure ] is a factor [ the court ] weigh[ s ] in [ the ] certification calculus.”);
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (considering “intense pressure to
settle”); Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834–35 (7th Cir. 1999) (arguing that the grant
of class certification “sounds the death knell” and “can put considerable pressure on the defendant
to settle”).
265. See, e.g., Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d at 317; see Klonoff, supra note 243, at
755–56.
266. 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
267. See id. at 342–48.
268. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
269. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 342–47, 360–72.
270. Id. at 372 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
271. See id. at 369–70 (citing authorities for the proposition).
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requirements.272 One of them, Rule 23(b)(3), requires that common questions of
law and fact predominate and that the class mechanism be the superior mechanism
for adjudicating the case.273 Justice Ginsburg argued, correctly in my view, that the
majority in the case imported Rule 23(b)(3) criteria into the threshold consideration
of Rule 23(a), empowering courts to pick apart classes at an earlier stage.274 The
Court focused on how the case was based on “literally millions of employment
decisions,” potentially involving differing reasons for disfavoring individual female
plaintiffs, where managers likely used their discretion, even if discriminatorily, in
various different ways.275 The plaintiffs, too, were different: they held many jobs,
some for longer than others, across thousands of stores, and under the supervision
of a variety of managers.276 As Justice Ginsburg put it, “The [majority’s]
‘dissimilarities’ approach leads the Court to train its attention on what distinguishes
individual class members, rather than on what unites them.”277 Rather than
understanding the plaintiffs as a group of citizens alleging gender discrimination in
Wal-Mart’s hiring and promotion policies, the Court disaggregated them as
atomistic citizens defined by their differences.
In a variety of contexts, the Court has leaned into the presumption that the
citizen-consumer litigates alone in ways that disarm class litigation. Particularly in
the mass litigation surrounding asbestos exposure, the Court has undone
precertification settlements because of its concerns about individual rights and due
process, even if those concerns all but meant that plaintiffs facing mass harm would
not obtain relief.278 For example, in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, the Court
rejected a precertification class settlement in large part because the lower courts had
not engaged in the Rule 23 analysis to protect the individual due process rights of
absent individuals as if the case were going to trial.279 A class certified for the
purposes of settlement thus needs to meet the requirements of Rule 23 in the same
272. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
273. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (permitting certification where “the court finds that the questions
of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy”).
274. See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 375 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (“The
Court blends Rule 23(a)(2)’s threshold criterion with the more demanding criteria of Rule 23(b)(3), and
thereby elevates the (a)(2) inquiry so that it is no longer easily satisfied.” (internal quotations omitted)).
275. Id. at 352, 370–75.
276. See id. at 359–60.
277. Id. at 377 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
278. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1475,
1475–76 (2005) (arguing the Supreme Court has “transformed Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3)’s ‘superiority’ requirement into a mandate of perfection”); see also Sergio J. Campos, The
Uncertain Path of Class Action Law, 40 CARDOZO L. REV. 2223, 2227 (2019) (arguing that in various
contexts, the Court’s attempt to disaggregate classes and view them as exceptions to bilateral litigation
is a “threat to the very existence of the class action itself, insofar as the Court has slowly forgotten the
utility of, and thus the justification for, the class action procedure”).
279. 521 U.S. 591, 625–26, 628 (1997). And in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864–65
(1999), the Court rejected another precertification settlement and cabined the availability of “limited
fund” class actions pursuant to Rule 23(b)(1)(B).
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way as a class certified for trial.280 The result, as Elizabeth Cabraser put it, was that
“the perfect was the enemy of the good: the multibillion-dollar settlement, rejected
by the Supreme Court, was lost forever, and thousands of claimants who would
gladly have traded their pristine due process rights for substantial monetary
compensation have been consigned to the endless waiting that characterizes
asbestos bankruptcies.”281
In valorizing individual rights and autonomy over practical aggregate
resolution, the Court has constructed, as Samuel Issacharoff has argued, a
“cartoonish depiction of aggregation as a departure from an idealized individual
litigant claiming [their] day in court.”282 The Court’s “Sunday-school oratory about
the importance of the rights of individuals standing before the courts” is often
ill-matched to permitting plaintiffs to obtain relief from mass harm.283 Rather than
asking how the class mechanism can facilitate that relief, the Court doubles down
on the presumptions of bilateral adjudication.284 These cases follow a general trend
where the Court has relied on individual rights and autonomy to weaken class
actions, including by strengthening opt-out rights and the ability of absent class
members to attack settlements.285 And these decisions tend to focus on the
vulnerability of defendants and power of plaintiffs, while not “account[ing for] the
collective benefits of the class action to plaintiffs.”286
The past few decades of the procedure of class actions feature several
neoliberal moves: a near-exclusive focus on the power of plaintiffs and vulnerability
of defendants with scant attention to the structures of modern economic power
that harm plaintiffs and make it difficult for them to seek redress, a multifaceted
effort to disaggregate the class and therefore make plaintiffs proceed (if they can)
individually, and a form of procedural perfectionism fueled by a judicially
constructed presumption that individual action is the baseline and that collective
action is the outlier. The story of class action law in the past generation is the
mounting of hurdle after hurdle to thwart the possibility of collective action.

280. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620–22.
281. Cabraser, supra note 278, at 1476.
282. Samuel Issacharoff, “Shocked”: Mass Torts and Aggregate Asbestos Litigation After
Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1925, 1929–30 (2002).
283. Id.
284. See id. at 1927.
285. See Alexandra D. Lahav, Due Process and the Future of Class Actions,
44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 545, 551–56 (2012); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812
(1985) (discussing the foundations of the opt-out right).
286. Lahav, supra note 285, at 553. The class action, which has at times been understood from
a “regulatory conception” as a mechanism of public administration to enforce regulatory law, is
increasingly understood as a mere joinder rule. See generally David Marcus, The History of the Modern
Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und Drang, 1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587 (2013).
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E. Coda: Other Areas
The analysis of core doctrinal areas above is illustrative and covers many of
the leading doctrines and cases defining the current era of procedure. It is not,
however, fully exhaustive. Indeed, other procedural changes that define the new era
are neoliberal. Consider briefly two others: discovery and personal jurisdiction.
While Rule 26 initially laid out a liberal discovery framework, it has been
narrowed over the past few decades—mostly through rulemaking amendments.287
These amendments have, among other things, limited the scope of discovery,
introduced required initial disclosures, and introduced proportionality requirements
into discovery.288 They have also introduced more judicial management over
discovery.289 The amendments show how neoliberalism in procedure is not limited
to judicial decisions. Corporate forces pushed for these changes in part by putting
forward narratives about plaintiff power run amok—narratives that, though strained
for empirical support, stuck with rule-makers.290 The “pervasive myth of discovery
abuse” came to the center of reform efforts,291 despite the fact that in most cases,
only a few hours are spent on discovery.292 And, once again, that myth obscured
and constructed power. Reforms to restrict and reduce parties’ access to discovery
have been, as Brooke Coleman has shown, based on one-sided “plaintiff
skepticism” fueled by narratives about plaintiff power and corporate defendant
vulnerability.293 The view of power presented in the previous Sections thus also
extends to discovery reform.
287. See, e.g., Brooke D. Coleman, Discovering Innovation: Discovery Reform and Federal Civil
Rulemaking, 51 AKRON L. REV. 765, 772 (2017) (“The original discovery rules, namely under Rule 26,
allowed for the discovery of all relevant information related to the subject matter of the litigation.”).
288. See id. at 775–79 (overviewing the history of these changes). See generally Linda S. Mullenix,
Hope over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795
(1991) (providing an in-depth account of the dynamics behind the significant 1993 amendments).
289. See, e.g., Endo, supra note 131, at 1335–36 (overviewing these developments);
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b), (g) advisory committee’s notes to 1983 amendment (“In an appropriate case the
court could restrict the number of depositions, interrogatories, or the scope of a production request.”).
290. See Paul D. Carrington, Learning from the Rule 26 Brouhaha: Our Courts Need Real Friends,
156 F.R.D. 295, 303 (1994) (overviewing these narratives and their role in shaping rulemaking); Jeffrey
W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529,
623–25 (2001) (exploring the role of the corporate bar in pushing the narrative of discovery as abuse);
see also Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium,
59 BROOK. L. REV. 841, 845 (1993) (critiquing the lack of empirical support for the 1993 “required
disclosure” amendments to Rule 26).
291. Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse
and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1396 (1994).
292. See JAMES S. KAKALIK, DEBORAH R. HENSLER, DANIEL F. MCCAFFREY, MARIAN
OSHIRO, NICHOLAS M. PACE & MARY E. VAIANA, RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST., DISCOVERY
MANAGEMENT: FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EVALUATION
DATA 28 (1998).
293. Coleman, supra note 138, at 1779, 1790. As the defense bar pushed the narrative that
discovery costs were out of hand and discovery was inefficient, rule-makers paid heed, introducing a
series of amendments to restrict discovery. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 8, at 354. As one rule-maker put
it, “In retrospect, our collective judgment was more impressionistic than empirical.” Id. This fact he
attributes to, among other things, the composition of the rulemaking committees. See id. at 355 n.262.
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And discovery reform has been based on an efficiency-as-cost rationale that
equates discovery with inefficiency merely because it entails costs for corporate
defendants, both deviating from historical procedural efficiency analysis and failing
to consider the other values that exist alongside and sometimes push against a focus
on pecuniary cost.294 As Coleman summarizes it, the rule-makers behind discovery
reform are “no longer focused on discovery as a mechanism for a full exchange of
information that can then lead to a determination of the merits” but instead are
“focused on lowering the cost of discovery, without any express or even implied
reflection on how restrictions on discovery might affect the ability of parties to get
to trial.”295 As was the case in the exploration of pleading standards and arbitration
above, in the discovery context efficiency has both taken on tantamount importance
and been reduced to considerations of defendants’ costs.
Similarly, in the personal jurisdiction context, the Court has narrowed its
doctrine of where corporate defendants can be sued under specific jurisdiction and
where they can be considered to be “at home” under general jurisdiction in
decisions that ignore questions of power and access for the plaintiffs, focusing
instead on corporate interests and inconveniences, and along the way even
thwarting aggregate litigation.296 The Court’s specific and general jurisdiction
decisions make it more difficult for plaintiffs to sue corporations, in particular
foreign corporations, in convenient fora and instead focus on the inconveniences
to corporate defendants without focusing on the considerable obstacles that
plaintiffs face.297 The Court’s stringent focus on contacts and devaluing of fairness
factors has paved the way for taking plaintiffs and the power considerations that

294. Coleman, supra note 138, at 1790; see also Endo, supra note 131 (exploring other values);
Zambrano, supra note 129 (same). Along the way, Maureen Carroll argues that courts’ discovery
decisions may link to and exacerbate economic inequality. See Maureen Carroll, Civil Procedure and
Economic Inequality, 69 DEPAUL L. REV. 269, 281–84 (2020).
295. Coleman, supra note 138, at 1815.
296. See generally Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1
(2018) [ hereinafter Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction ]; Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction in the Trump Era, 87
FORDHAM L. REV. 73 (2018) [ hereinafter Dodson, Jurisdiction in the Trump Era ].
297. See Michael H. Hoffheimer, End of the Line for General Territorial Jurisdiction,
87 TENN. L. REV. 419, 463–64 (2020) (exploring the personal jurisdiction revolution, its lack of
emphasis on plaintiff’s ability to bring cases, and its hurdles to plaintiffs’ access to justice); Michael
Vitiello, Limiting Access to U.S. Courts: The Supreme Court’s New Personal Jurisdiction Case Law, 21
U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 209, 267–68 (2015) (considering pro-corporation and anti-plaintiff bias
of cases); Arthur R. Miller, McIntyre in Context: A Very Personal Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV. 465,
475–76 (2012) (exploring how defendants can structure their behavior to do business in all states while
avoiding the reach of most, or any, state courts such that “[ n ]o longer would injured consumers and
employees be free to bring cases where they receive defective products or services, or live, or were
injured; rather, plaintiffs might have to litigate in distant fora, and possibly in other countries, or
abandon their claims altogether”). See generally Alan M. Trammell & Derek E. Bambauer, Personal
Jurisdiction and the “Interwebs,” 100 CORNELL L. REV. 1129 (2015) (exploring the difficulties of
establishing personal jurisdiction in the internet context and calling for a return of fairness and
predictability factors).
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affect them out of the equation.298 And recent personal jurisdiction decisions
contribute to a larger arc of procedural decision-making that is animated by hostility
to aggregate litigation.299 Recent decisions have “imbued [personal jurisdiction] with
a powerful disaggregation effect by requiring a close connection between the forum
state, each defendant, and each claim.”300 This means plaintiffs with similar injuries
who may best proceed in aggregate form, if injured in separate states, may not be
able to sue defendants together in certain circumstances.301
Neoliberal logics thus increasingly infuse procedural decisions as early in
litigation as the court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction and as late as its rulings on
summary judgment motions on the eve of trial.
III. ANALYZING PROCEDURE’S NEOLIBERAL TURN
Thus far, this Article has explored the contours and dimensions of neoliberal
procedure. Having laid this descriptive foundation, this Part takes a step back to
analyze neoliberal civil procedure at a more general level. It first considers what is
distinctive about neoliberal civil procedure. It then considers the forces that made
its rise possible.
A. Its Distinctiveness
Civil procedure both tracks and adds wrinkles to neoliberalism’s features. It
offers its own conception of efficiency and a one-sided view of power and
vulnerability. It protects existing market arrangements and constructs market
rationality through plausibility analysis. And it also protects the market from
regulatory litigation by constructing judicial procedures as less efficient than private
ones and citizens as consumers choosing individualized dispute resolution
mechanisms. Efficiency once pegged to matching streamlined process with parties’
ability to vindicate their rights has become a nearly one-sided analysis of corporate
defendants’ costs. And that analysis is often not scaled to the size of the defendant
or the nature of the case. Power in modern procedural decisions is not so much
absent as distorted. Corporate Goliaths are posed as powerless against the weight
of the Rules, and plaintiffs are caricatured as wielding extortionate influence.
Substantive views naturalizing market arrangements are snuck into procedural
decisions through plausibility analysis. And judicial procedures—the Rules made
298. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299–300 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s decision “focus[ es ] tightly on the existence of
contacts between the forum and the defendant” and that “[ t ]he essential inquiry in locating the
constitutional limits on state-court jurisdiction over absent defendants is whether the particular exercise
of jurisdiction offends traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” (internal
quotations omitted)).
299. See Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction, supra note 296.
300. Id. at 4–5.
301. See id. at 5 (“This restrictive approach to personal jurisdiction means that similarly situated
plaintiffs injured in different states are unlikely to be able to sue codefendants from different
states . . . in the same lawsuit.”).
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and amended through a public process—are framed as costly and inefficient. The
citizen-consumer, we are told, is better off turning to a private forum for dispute
resolution—whether or not they meaningfully choose that forum. And, finally, the
citizen-consumer is better off going it alone, whether in court or arbitration.
Collective action and power must cede to efficiency and individual autonomy.
Neoliberal civil procedure therefore uses process as a gateway for importing
substantive judgments about the State and the market into law. And it feeds off a
certain bias in how power and efficiency are construed. Indeed, the problem is not
that considerations such as cost to defendants or plaintiffs’ power have entered into
procedural analysis. It is that these considerations have become the modus operandi
of procedural decision-making in the new era, to the exclusion of other variables
and considerations.
Neoliberal civil procedure is also somewhat distinctive for other reasons that
have to do with its reach and foundations. In this way, it is like neoliberal
constitutional law. Jedediah Britton-Purdy argues that constitutional neoliberalism
is characterized by its basicness, breadth, and integrating tendency.302 To an extent,
the same can be said about neoliberal civil procedure. The Constitution is more
basic, as the foundational document for our governmental structure and rights.303
However, civil procedure is basic because it provides the processes and norms for
enforcing non-criminal constitutional, statutory, and common law rights in federal
court. Civil procedure not only encompasses due process but also a host of other
shared considerations of who gets to call fellow citizens and the government to
account for wrongs and receive compensation (and maybe justice) in public. Civil
procedure is broad because the Rules are largely trans-substantive, governing all
kinds of non-criminal disputes. In this way, procedure influences the interpretations
that govern the substance of various kinds of constitutional and statutory law, as
well as common law interpretation. And it is integrating because its account of what
those processes should look like produces a moral image of the citizen, the State,
and public process, and it often shapes procedure used in state courts as well.
Procedural neoliberalism is also distinctive in another way: its method of
collateral attack. Neoliberal civil procedure is subterranean, collaterally attacking the
regulatory state and insulating the market. As Stephen Burbank and Sean Farhang
show, political attacks on courts and their procedures through the legislative process
have largely failed.304 Similarly, the regulatory legislation that procedure is often used
to enforce has proven durable. Procedural interpretation, however, has proven
effective at making it harder for citizens to enforce regulatory law—and thereby to
make it real in their lives.305 Without attacking the content of regulation or amending
the Rules, Supreme Court majorities have used procedural interpretation to make

302.
303.
304.
305.

See Purdy, supra note 23, at 195.
See id.
See generally BURBANK & FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT, supra note 12.
See generally id.
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regulatory law increasingly toothless. And neoliberal procedural interpretation exists
largely behind the scenes; as the judges deconstruct the foundation of the house
from below, the public and media see very little.306 The result is somewhat strong
regulatory rights with weakened judicial enforcement mechanisms and a market
increasingly shielded from further democratic control through litigation. Neoliberal
civil procedure is in this way perhaps more subversive than other forms of
legal neoliberalism.
B. Its Drivers
How did the current era of federal civil procedure come to be neoliberal? The
neoliberal era did not just arise out of thin air—in civil procedure or elsewhere. This
Section considers the conditions that permitted neoliberalism’s rise in civil
procedure. Indeed, for those who seek to resist it, understanding how neoliberalism
came to increasingly permeate our federal civil procedure is a necessary first step.
As elsewhere, the story is complex and not amenable to easy generalizations.
Neoliberal ideas began to infiltrate U.S. law in the 1970s, and scholars have offered
a variety of background conditions that explain its rise, including the end of the
period of relative posterity that characterized the post-World War II period and the
renewed prominence of questions of distribution that led some to turn back towards
market-modeled concepts to blunt redistributive efforts.307 Some of the background
drivers that these scholars explore—like the rise of strands of law and economics
scholarship—extend to the rise of neoliberalism in civil procedure.308 However,
neoliberal civil procedure has its own political economy and institutional story. The
account overlaps with the one that scholars develop about the rise of the new era
of civil procedure generally.309 But seeing how those background forces relate to
neoliberalism helps to cohere those forces and puts the drivers of the current era in
new light. And, on the flip side, for scholars of neoliberalism, the story offers a more
fine-grained understanding of how neoliberalism arose in courts and came to
shape procedure.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that one perhaps intuitive answer that
this Part does not offer is that there was a seepage of neoliberalism from our
“substantive” law to our “procedural” law.310 It may be tempting to think that as
areas of law came to embody neoliberal premises, it was only a matter of time before
306. See generally Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, The Subterranean Counterrevolution: The
Supreme Court, the Media, and Litigation Retrenchment, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 293 (2016).
307. See, e.g., Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 2, at 1817–18.
308. See id. at 1816 (“Without being reductionist, we can recognize law and economics as both
autonomous scholarship and as a partial rationalization that gained support within a specific political
economy.”).
309. And in particular, many of these neoliberal forces—although they are not characterized as
such—are summarized in Subrin & Main, supra note 7.
310. For an overview of approaches to thinking about the distinction, or lack thereof, between
procedure and substance and for a theory of the distinction, see Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice,
78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 192–225 (2004).
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our procedure followed suit. However, neoliberal civil procedure was coterminous
with neoliberalism elsewhere and arose from both overlapping and distinct forces
from those in other areas of law. Neoliberal civil procedure is both different and
the same.
1. The Influence of Economic Theory
One influence—particularly seen in the plausibility realm and in the judicial
focus on efficiency—is economic theory and its translation into law through some
law and economics scholarship. What we conceive of as the modern
law and economics field that came up in the second half of the twentieth century
was really the second generation of law and economics in U.S. law. The first
generation of law and economics scholars—such as Robert Lee Hale and Walton
Hamilton—wrote against post-Industrial Revolution laissez-faire claims and
focused on how purportedly neutral market arrangements were actually sites of
coercion and power relationships shaped by legal norms and political
decision-making.311 They therefore justified government efforts to reshape market
rules (understanding and clarifying that law always structured markets and thereby
attacking the myth of laissez-faire).312 The iteration of law and economics that
reached its zenith in the second half of the twentieth century had many strands, and
not all contributed to the rise of neoliberal civil procedure. One, in particular, did.
As Stephen Teles has explored in depth, a variant of law and economics arose out
of a group of University of Chicago Law School professors, drawing upon the work
of Friedrich Hayek to critique and challenge the prominent legal-regulatory order
and its development.313 This strand of law and economics scholars refocused legal
analysis around questions of efficiency and wealth maximization in a
market-insulating fashion. And civil procedure was no exception to this approach.
Scholars in this camp wrote articles about procedural excesses and their
inefficiency. Recall from the summary judgment context the article Discovery as
Abuse,314 penned by then-professor, now-Judge Frank Easterbrook, which created
a narrative of discovery costs gone awry (a claim hardly supported by the data then
and now).315 Some of those scholars soon became judges whose attention scholars
311. See generally BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ
FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998) (examining the first
law and economics movement).
312. See id.
313. See STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE
BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 91 (2008); see also Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 2, at 1815
(exploring the roots of the modern law and economics field).
314. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
315. See, e.g., Subrin & Main, supra note 7, at 1850–51 (“In the majority of cases there is very
little or no discovery and, in the other cases, the amount of discovery is, by any reasonable measure,
proportionate to the stakes.”); Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil
Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785, 791 (1998) (“Cases involving extensive discovery are in fact relatively
rare—the studies using actual file reviews uncovered very few cases involving more than ten discovery
requests . . . .”); Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel,
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could capture by writing about efficiency and excess.316 And, as we saw in the
summary judgment framework, some law and economics scholarship was cited by
and relied upon by Supreme Court justices in constructing plausible views of the
market.317 The emphasis of law and economics on efficiency and wealth
maximization made it a natural counterpart for the corporate forces in the 1970s
who were opposed to the growing footprint of the regulatory state and litigation’s
role in regulatory enforcement and governance. As Subrin and Main write, the
“emphasis [of law and economics] on wealth maximization and efficiency fits easily
into, and readily supported, the conservative agenda to reduce regulation and curtail
civil litigation.”318 At the same time, wealthy donors created foundations to support
law and economics scholars in law schools.319 The “philosophical thrust [of law and
economics] in the direction of free markets and limited government” put it at odds
with an increasingly regulatory state that relied on courts and procedural protections
and stricture to carry out regulatory goals.320
2. The Corporatization of the Bar and Rulemaking Process
At the same time, as federal rights of action under regulatory statutes grew and
were aided by the class action mechanism, some corporate lawyers increasingly saw
the liberal regime put into effect by the Rules as being against their clients’ interests.
The modern corporate law firm—growing to be business-like and managerial
itself—took on a leading role for corporate clients in trying to peel back the
procedural protections that had been gained in the first few decades of the Rules.321
Major law firm partners and in-house corporate lawyers became early crusaders
against procedural protections that their clients increasingly saw as interfering with
their business interests. In the media and at conferences, they attacked liberal
pleading regimes, class actions, discovery, settlement pressures, and rogue juries.322
And over time, some of them became the authors of the briefs behind the cases

39 B.C. L. REV. 683, 684–86 (1998) (gathering studies showing there is little to no discovery in the
majority of cases).
316. Prominent examples include Frank Easterbrook, Richard Posner, and Robert Bork.
317. See supra notes 62, 129 and accompanying text.
318. See Subrin & Main, supra note 7, at 1871.
319. See id.
320. See TELES, supra note 313, at 188–89 (quoting Jim Piereson). See generally JEAN STEFANCIC
& RICHARD DELGADO, NO MERCY: HOW CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS
CHANGED AMERICA’S SOCIAL AGENDA (1996).
321. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Andrew Wasson, A Reflection on Rulemaking: The Rule 11
Experience, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 563, 564–66 (2004) (exploring how the “1980[ s ] witnessed a
perception growing in the minds of some federal judges and some corporate executives and their
lawyers, of a problem in need of a solution that arose from the liberality and tolerance embedded in the
1938 Federal Rules”).
322. See Subrin & Main, supra note 7, at 1864 (exploring corporate attacks on pleading, juries,
class actions, and settlement).
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that have shaped U.S. neoliberal civil procedure.323 Just a few decades before, the
corporate bar had powerful members supporting the rise of the Federal Rules, in
part because they thought simplified procedure could facilitate the quick resolution
of claims for their clients.324 But as their large, institutional clients faced complicated
and sometimes massive cases, some forces within the corporate bar sought to tame
the lion their forebears had helped raise.
The corporate bar also came to take on an outsize role in rulemaking. The
practitioners largely responsible for drafting and amending the Rules have
increasingly and disproportionately been chosen from the corporate bar.325 Most of
the rule-makers, however, are judges.326 And the judges came to “skew in a
conservative direction” at the same time that Republican leaders were coming to
critique litigation and its relationship to the regulatory state.327 In some
circumstances, such as discovery, the composition of the rulemaking bodies has
resulted in rulemaking that is pro-corporate defendant. And where the Supreme
Court and lower courts engage in procedural reinterpretation of the Rules, often led
by justices concerned about litigation overreach and judges picked from the
corporate bar, the committees are less likely to correct the Court or respond.
3. The Changing Shape of the Judiciary
The shape of the judiciary has also changed in ways that facilitated the rise of
neoliberal civil procedure. Lawyers from the corporate bar, in particular, have taken
prominence on the federal appellate courts, engaging in procedural interpretation
that binds the district courts that must oversee pleading, discovery, summary
judgment, class certification decisions, and the like.328 Lawyers who have spent the
majority of their careers in private practice—and in particular, “in business-oriented
firms that derive their revenues from business transactions and litigation
representing the interests of corporations”—made up, as of 2020, sixty-five percent
of the federal appellate bench.329 As of that time, only about one percent of judges
on the appellate bench had spent the majority of their practice as legal aid attorneys
and only a handful had significant experience representing civil rights claimants.330
323. Indeed, the Supreme Court appellate bar is overwhelmingly composed of lawyers
representing corporations. See Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1008,
1016–17 (2016).
324. See, e.g., Luke P. Norris, Labor and the Origins of Civil Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 462,
508–09 (2017) (exploring the role of ABA lawyers, many of whom were corporate counsel).
325. See Coleman, supra note 323; Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court
Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 15 NEV. L.J. 1559, 1566–68 (2015).
326. See Coleman, supra note 323.
327. See id.
328. See, e.g., Maggie Jo Buchanan, The Startling Lack of Professional Diversity Among Federal
Judges, CTR. AM. PROGRESS (June 17, 2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/courts/news/
2020/06/17/486366/startling-lack-professional-diversity-among-federal-judges/[ https://perma.cc/
Q6LC-MY9T ].
329. See id.
330. See id.
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The result is that “the majority of judges on the appellate bench have legal expertise
that was predominantly gained through the lens of advancing the interest of
businesses.”331 This is changing somewhat with the recent federal judicial
appointments and nominations by the Biden Administration, but the federal bench
is still skewed in its composition.332
None of this is to say that these judges strive to be anything but impartial.
Many would likely not share the view, expressed by Justice Powell just before he
assumed the bench, that litigation by civil rights groups, labor unions, and
nonprofits constituted a “broad attack” on business interests and needed to be
reined in.333 But, at the same time, the experience of the appellate bench is simply
slanted. A supermajority of judges have spent their careers representing
corporations, and some of them developing arguments to try to push plaintiffs’
claims out of courts at every stage. We saw decisions above that were one-sided in
their focus on the pressures on defendants and the power of plaintiffs. One reason
that these judges may construct power this way, and recoil from the process baked
into the Rules, is that they spent the formative years of their careers putting
themselves in the shoes of corporate defendants. Many had no experience
representing the parties who bring the lion’s share of federal statutory
claims—workers, consumers, small businesses, and patients.
The trend of appointing judges with principally corporate-law experience has
been bipartisan.334 Democrats put judges who were corporate lawyers up for
judgeships in part to assuage and win the support of Republicans in Congress.335
Judges who represented corporate interests—but might be socially liberal and
defend Democratic interests in other ways—were simply more palatable for both
parties, especially as the Democratic Party attempted to forge better relationships
with the business community.336

331. Id.
332. A December 2021 report found that, 19.7% of Biden’s nominees have civil rights
experience, 14.1% have plaintiff-side experience, and 4.2% have legal services experience. All. for Just.,
A Fairer Court: How President Biden and Congress Raised the Bar in 2021 (Dec. 2021),
https://www.afj.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/A-Fairer-Court-How-President-Biden-and-Congress
-Raised-the-Bar-in-2021.pdf [ https://perma.cc/KY6W-UTXD ].
333. Confidential Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman,
Educ. Comm., U.S. Chamber of Com., Attack on American Free Enterprise System 1 (Aug. 23, 1971),
http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Powell%20Archives/PowellMemorandumTypescript.pdf [ https://
perma.cc/NQ78-J7L2 ].
334. See Brian Fallon & Christopher Kang, No More Corporate Lawyers on the Federal
Bench, ATLANTIC (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/08/
no-more-corporate-judges/596383/ [ https://perma.cc/5QGM-JKR7 ] (“For years, presidents of
both parties, along with the senators who advise on their judicial selections, have favored a certain kind
of résumé . . . But perhaps no qualification is more prevalent than prior work at a major private-sector
firm, representing the interests of large corporations.”).
335. See id.
336. See id.
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4. Politicization of Legal Process
Political pressure may also have shaped the rise of neoliberal civil procedure.
Members of both political parties have called out what they saw as excessive
plaintiffs litigation and proposed legislation to rein in civil process.337 The politicians
seeking to reform courts have been as diverse as then-Senator Joseph R. Biden Jr.
and Representative Newt Gingrich.338 However, as Burbank and Farhang show, the
locus of the legislative agenda to reform courts came from the Republican Party.339
They examine how Reagan administration officials “well understood” the growth
of private enforcement of regulatory statutes and were concerned about “invasive,
disruptive, and costly lawsuits.”340 An ambitious reform proposal—restricting
attorneys’ fees to cut off private enforcement—was proposed during the early days
of President Reagan’s term. It did not pass, and the legislative efforts to curb
procedure and courts largely failed in the years ahead, but as Burbank and Farhang
suggest, it “signaled the emergence of a movement.”341
One could argue that these failures could have emboldened courts to resist
neoliberal impulses by showing that the procedures the Rules embodied continually
survived political attack. However, these efforts also demonstrated that courts and
their procedures were under attack. Judges, jealous of their status and authority, and
protective of the seemingly fragile role of courts in our legal order, may well have
received these attacks differently and felt the need to respond by reining in
procedure and remaking it around concepts like efficiency. And, as I explore in the
next Section, the precarious position of courts makes this conclusion more likely.
5. Institutional Vulnerability and Adaptation
Another component of the story—perhaps the most essential—is an
institutional one of both judicial empowerment and neglect. Congress empowered
courts in the federal regulatory system by creating a bevy of private causes of action
in regulatory statutes, elevating citizens in regulatory enforcement, but it did not
increase courts’ resources or capacity sufficiently to meet the demand the expansion
caused.342 This left courts overworked and overburdened by civil litigation (not to
mention rising criminal dockets).343 Under this pressure, courts creatively adapted
to run themselves like businesses.344 This had two effects. The first was to put
efficiency and case management at the center of judicial attention. The second was
337. See Burbank & Farhang, Litigation Reform, supra note 12, at 1551–57 (describing the
political attack beginning in the Reagan administration); Subrin & Main, supra note 7, at 1867–68
(describing political forces generally).
338. See Subrin & Main, supra note 7, at 1867–68.
339. See Burbank & Farhang, Litigation Reform, supra note 12, at 1551–57.
340. Id. at 1551.
341. Id. at 1545.
342. See, e.g., Subrin & Main, supra note 7, at 1859–62.
343. See id.
344. For the most prominent account of the forces behind this form of management and what
it looks like, see generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).

Clean Final Edit_Norris_v2.docx (Do Not Delete)

2022 ]

NEOLIBERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE

2/1/22 9:20 PM

519

to put democratic procedure—with all of its stricture and layers—in potential
perceived tension with the perceived survival and legitimacy of courts. The most
subtle but maybe most powerful reason explaining the rise of neoliberal civil
procedure is that Congress created the conditions—through empowerment and
neglect—for courts to become neoliberal in their doctrinal approach to survive.
Those who were more committed to neoliberalism—who were opposed to the
growing demands of the regulatory state and sought to remake the shape of courts
in the image of the market—found fertile ground in federal courts struggling to
manage their caseloads.
As with the general story about neoliberalism, the 1970s stand out as a turning
point. As the regulatory state grew, civil caseload filings rose exponentially in the
1970s and 1980s.345 Importantly, the growth in caseload well-outpaced the growth
in the number of judges added to the bench.346 Plaintiffs bringing statutory claims
under regulatory statutes were a significant part of the increase in cases.347 The
modern class action mechanism, introduced in 1966, also proved a somewhat
powerful component of this regime, giving attorneys incentives to bring claims
alleging and seeking to remedy distributed and sometimes systemic harm.348 The
claims of some economists, corporate lawyers, politicians, and others about the
excesses of litigation gained more traction as courts came under pressure from
mounting dockets and complex regulatory causes of action. By expanding the
responsibilities of courts without expanding their capacities, Congress made courts
feel the pinch of their growing regulatory function, and it made them susceptible to
claims that the regulatory state—of which judges were part—was an
inertial Leviathan.
Courts came to run themselves like businesses to survive. As Subrin and Main
describe it, “The judges’ reaction to the perception that things were ‘out of control’
was to ‘take control.’”349 Case management became one solution. Warren Burger,
who would become Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 1969, had as early as a
decade previously, when he was a court of appeals judge, called for case
management and for courts to integrate business management techniques.350 Judges
managed cases by taking more control of discovery and other features of pretrial
process and often by promoting settlement.351 Moving cases along was the
overarching goal. Federal district court judges felt new pressure as each judge was
moved to a calendar system and held accountable for the pace of clearing their

345. See Subrin & Main, supra note 7, at 1859.
346. See id.; Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 548 tbl.A-12 (2004).
347. See Subrin & Main, supra note 7, at 1859.
348. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
349. See Subrin & Main, supra note 7, at 1861.
350. See id. at 1862; Warren E. Burger, The Courts on Trial, Speech at the American Bar
Association (Feb. 21, 1956), in WARREN E. BURGER, DELIVERY OF JUSTICE 4, 6 (1990).
351. See generally Resnik, supra note 344.
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docket. Case “clearing” time became one of the core pieces of data collected.352
Calls for case management and business-like efficiency came from judges appointed
by presidents of both parties and had the support of political leaders from both
parties.353 The result, as Judith Resnik argued, is that the federal judiciary has not
only taken on a “corporate identity,” but part of that identity, as expressed
in its rulemaking and education functions, has been anti-adjudication
and pro-settlement.354
Procedural provisions allowing for liberal pleading, discovery, summary
judgment, and class certification, among other features of procedure, came to stand
in the way of judicial efficiency and management. The pinch on courts became a
pinch on procedure. As the federal docket grew and outpaced the growth in judicial
capacity, these phenomena, in the words of Judge Robert Carter, “fueled demands
that the Rules be revised or reinterpreted in such a way as to encourage quick or
economic dispositions.”355 Efficiency became the “criterion of successful judicial
functioning.”356 And as Resnik summarized, the entire conversation around
procedure changed and the judiciary itself came to be one reflecting “failing faith”
in adjudication.357 “We have,” she wrote, “moved from arguments about the need
to foster judicial decisions ‘on the merits’ by simplifying procedure to conversations
about the desirability of limiting the use of courts in general and of the federal courts
in particular.”358
These phenomena, too, structured the turn away from courts and towards
arbitration and other forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR). The 1976
“Pound Conference” was a turning point. As Andrew Mamo explains, the
Conference dealt with “concerns regarding the institutional capabilities of the courts
to handle all the claims brought before them amidst the perception of rapid growth
in litigation rates caused by a growth in regulation, administrative costs of the
welfare state, and a breakdown of the social fabric.”359 Some of the participants in
the Pound Conference, such as then-Solicitor General and future Judge Robert
Bork, critiqued courts for their regulatory function.360 Indeed, some of the most

352. See Subrin & Main, supra note 7, at 1863.
353. Id. at 1867.
354. See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 995 (2000).
355. Robert L. Carter, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a Vindicator of Civil Rights,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2181 (1989).
356. Id.
357. See generally Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline,
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986).
358. Id. at 497.
359. Andrew B. Mamo, Three Ways of Looking at Dispute Resolution,
54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1399, 1411–12 (2019).
360. See Robert H. Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, Address at the
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice
(Apr. 8, 1976), in Warren E. Burger, Preface to THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE
IN THE FUTURE 150, 150–51 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1979).
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prominent voices at the Pound Conference were members of the corporate bar,
lamenting the excesses of litigation.361 Others had real concerns about courts,
including how they would treat historically marginalized groups, and turned to ADR
as a community-based alternative to courts.362 Others still were defenders of the
Rules and legal process; they were simply seeking refuge for claims that they feared
would not receive solicitude from overburdened courts.363
Soon, ADR scholars of all stripes were talking about the most efficient fora
and institutional mechanisms for resolving disputes; economic analysis came to the
center of ADR scholarship.364 As Amy Cohen has argued,365 when Owen Fiss
penned his now canonical essay, Against Settlement, he was responding to these
forces.366 Fiss saw the influence of neoliberalism in Latin America and defended
courts as expositors of public values bound by procedure and process, and against
the pessimism about courts and the turn towards purportedly more efficient dispute
resolution mechanisms.367 Whatever one thinks about Fiss’s strong stance against
settlement, his fears about neoliberalism were prescient. And neoliberalism not only
came to structure the push for settlement; as Part II showed, it also shaped the
interpretation of the Rules in a variety of other contexts.
Arbitration, likewise, soon became more attractive to judges for its ability to
clear dockets and avoid discovery. Then-Judge and future Justice Burger argued in
1968 that “a large part of all litigation in the courts is an exercise in futility and
frustration.”368 Discovery, he continued, following a popular line, was excessive,
and the flood of cases entering courts showed that “we are the most litigious people
on the globe.”369 Judge Burger argued that ADR promised new and better routes
for resolving cases. In some ways, the narrative was overwrought.370 Most cases, as
I explained above, have little or no discovery.371 And it has long been established
that Americans are not very litigious, but as new regulatory causes of action cropped
up and judges’ dockets became fuller, the narrative took hold.372 Bork was right at
the Pound Conference when he said that the modern welfare and regulatory state
361. See Subrin & Main, supra note 7, at 1864 (exploring the role of corporate lawyers Simon
H. Rifkind and Francis R. Kirkham).
362. See Mamo, supra note 359, at 1414–15.
363. See id.
364. See id. at 1414, 1419–20.
365. Amy J. Cohen, Revisiting Against Settlement: Some Reflections on Dispute Resolution and
Public Values, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1143, 1150–51 (2009).
366. See Fiss, supra note 167.
367. See generally id.
368. Warren E. Burger, Remarks to the American Arbitration Association (Nov. 25, 1968), in
WARREN E. BURGER, DELIVERY OF JUSTICE 27, 27 (1990).
369. Warren E. Burger, Remarks at the Arthur T. Vanderbilt Dinner (Nov. 18, 1982), in
WARREN E. BURGER, DELIVERY OF JUSTICE 121, 123 (1990).
370. Burger, supra note 368, at 30–31.
371. See supra note 315 and accompanying text.
372. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4,
5 (1983).
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was “changing the very nature of courts.”373 But he was also part of a cadre of
people drawing on these developments to push courts to change in order to restrict
their role in the regulatory enforcement and governance. As courts’ dockets grew,
the Rules, once celebrated for their democratic virtues, became lamented for
their inefficiency.
Had Congress expanded the federal courts’ capacity to meet the new claims,
neoliberal civil procedure may have not been the success it has been or may have
taken another course. U.S. federal courts occupy a small slice of our government’s
budget, and better equipping them would have arguably been doable and
justifiable.374 But as courts felt the pressure of the demands of regulatory causes of
action, they were especially susceptible to the claims that they should be run like
businesses, that efficiency was key, and that litigation was cumbersome and needed
to be reformed. The Rules created a universe of democratic process. The pressures
of judging with inadequate resources gave judges reason to turn away from that
process, to turn to the fortress of the market for solutions. Suddenly, injecting
judges as gatekeepers into pleading, summary judgment, and class action decisions
made more sense: they could manage and weed out cases and claims, keeping their
calendars on par with their peers. And arbitration took cases mostly out of the
judges’ realm altogether.
In this sense, we can see how all of the forces this Part has considered interlink
and work together. As Congress made federal courts central to American regulatory
development and left them poorly equipped to carry out their functions, they
became fertile ground for the corporate bar and political forces skeptical of litigation
and regulation (and litigation as regulation) to sow doubts about procedure and to
turn the tide towards efficiency. Corporate lawyers also increasingly came to occupy
the bench, and lawyers who spent their careers representing workers, consumers,
patients, and small businesses increasingly did not. As federal courts felt the pinch
and saw the ranks of corporate lawyers and judges grow, the conditions were ripe
for neoliberalism to infuse procedure. The rest, as the doctrinal analysis above
showed, is history.
CONCLUSION: BEYOND NEOLIBERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE?
U.S. law is now nearly a half century into its neoliberal turn. As law increasingly
has been defined around efficiency, focused away from questions of power,
valorized market arrangements, and reshaped government institutions and citizens
around market concepts, civil procedure has not resisted the turn. Indeed, in some
373. See Bork, supra note 360.
374. See, e.g., Thomas Kaplan, Federal Courts, Running Out of Money, Brace for
Shutdown’s Pain, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/18/us/politics/
courts-money-government-shutdown.html [ https://perma.cc/4NV3-KSBL ] (“With roughly 33,000
employees nationwide and annual federal funding of under $8 billion, the judiciary makes up a tiny part
of the federal budget. In recent years, it has accounted for only about two-tenths of 1 percent of annual
federal spending.”).
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ways, neoliberal civil procedure has been a great success. Neoliberalism has hardly
been shown to have deep democratic support among the polity, which makes its
interventions tenuous.375 Because neoliberal civil procedure effects a collateral
attack on regulatory litigation and a subterranean valorization of the market, it
obscures its anti-democratic politics and operates largely behind the scenes.
For this reason, one possible future—maybe even a likely one—is the
continuing growth of neoliberal civil procedure. So long as procedural reform
remains subterranean, so long as it is not politically salient, it may be an especially
powerful tool of the neoliberal State. But other futures are possible. This Article has
articulated the logics and values of neoliberal civil procedure, and as they become
more apparent, those who oppose the neoliberal turn may find themselves in a
stronger position to challenge it. It is possible that the neoliberal era, like each era
of civil procedure before it, will come to an end. Fully undoing neoliberal civil
procedure—and resisting the pull of neoliberalism in our law generally—would
likely require a profound shift, a democratic reordering that is unlikely to occur
without a new governing coalition. Some believe that the current moment of
economic inequality and concentrated corporate power—now magnified by the
effects of an ongoing global pandemic—may pave the way in the years or decades
ahead towards a “new New Deal” or a democratic revival in which democracy gets
the upper hand in the ongoing conflict between it and
economic power.376
Should that democratic renaissance come, moving beyond neoliberal civil
procedure likely cannot be a story of return to the civil procedure that preceded the
neoliberal turn. The previous era of civil procedure had its merits: among them,
simplified pleading, easily accessible discovery, and a class action device that for
some time more easily allowed citizens to aggregate to address diffuse, complex
harms.377 However, the era was also founded on and largely shaped for a model of
litigation conducted by citizens who gain lawyers principally through the market,
have resources, and often resolve bilateral disputes.378 Too many citizens have
lacked the resources to bring claims against large institutional defendants, and if
they can bring them, to prosecute them adequately.379

375. See, e.g., Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 2, at 1832 (arguing that while neoliberalism has
been successful as intellectual, doctrinal, and policy shift, “it has always been a fragile configuration”).
376. See, e.g., Michelle Goldberg, Opinion, The New Great Depression Is Coming. Will There Be
a New New Deal?, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/02/opinion/
sunday/coronavirus-new-deal-ubi.html [ https://perma.cc/2P27-MUVQ ]; William J. Novak & Steven
W. Sawyer, The Need for Neodemocracy, LAW & POL. ECON. PROJECT (Nov. 7, 2019),
https://lpeblog.org/2019/11/07/the-need-for-neodemocracy/ [ https://perma.cc/98RE-WU7R ]
(“Neodemocracy involves a wholesale repudiation of the inheritance of neoliberalism and a
commitment to re-inventing and re-envisioning a new, critical democratic tradition.”).
377. See generally Miller, supra note 8 (exploring these characteristics).
378. See Resnik, supra note 357, at 513–15, 517 (explaining the various premises about resources
and parties baked into the Rules).
379. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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What, then, would a civil procedure for a revitalized democratic regulatory era
look like? The nature and scope of what such procedural design would look like
could fill volumes, but three broad and high-level points about what it might entail
are worth briefly exploring in concluding.
Beyond neoliberal norms. The first is that developing such a procedure may
require shifting normative focus beyond efficiency-as-cost and other neoliberal
values. The burgeoning “law and political economy” (LPE) approach offers a
useful starting point for expanding the focus of procedure. LPE is founded, in part,
on investigating how law interacts with and shapes the balance between democratic
and economic power.380 An LPE approach to procedure would put at its center a
focus on procedure’s political economy—on how procedure is central to how law
relates to economic ordering and to how citizens regulate economic behavior.381 It
would mean recognizing that seemingly neutral procedural rules can interact with
and reproduce existing distributions of power.382 Considerations of structure and
power might thus come to shape procedural design and redesign.383
Beyond the market-state. Achieving such a procedure may also involve
rethinking the role of the government as facilitator of litigation. For the public and
courts to participate with power in the regulatory ecosystem, they need supportive
institutions and procedural design. The government may need to take a more active
role in ensuring that citizens, their lawyers, and courts have the resources to fulfill
their regulatory functions. This would require an affirmative vision of the
government in setting the conditions for norm contest in courts. At a more concrete
level, it may well necessitate increasing funding to courts so that judicial attention
can be given to large, complex cases, while at the same time decreasing costs for
less-resourced parties, including court fees. And it may occasion dramatically
increasing funding or incentives for legal representation for plaintiffs, and perhaps
even going so far as guaranteeing representation as a matter of statutory law even
where constitutional due process does not require it.384

380. See Britton-Purdy et al., supra note 2, at 1784–93, 1818–27 (articulating a vision of LPE);
see also Luke Herrine, Consumer Protection After Consumer Sovereignty (unpublished manuscript)
(January 11, 2022) (on file with author) (articulating a “moral economy” framework for analyzing
consumer protection law).
381. See Norris, supra note 324 (outlining the idea of procedural political economy).
382. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2219, 2219–20 (1989)
(arguing that “we cannot and should not ignore the political content and consequences of procedural
rules” in part because of the role powerful forces played in shaping them to their advantage).
383. The focus—and the focus of the proposals of this Conclusion generally—gel with critical
civil procedure scholarship. See, e.g., A GUIDE TO CIVIL PROCEDURE: INTEGRATING CRITICAL LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES (Brooke D. Coleman, Suzette Malveaux, Portia Pedro & Elizabeth Porter eds.,
forthcoming May 2022); Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Procedure: ADR and the Justices’ ‘Second Wave’
Constriction of Court Access and Claim Development, 70 SMU L. REV. 765 (2017).
384. See generally FREDERICK WILMOT-SMITH, EQUAL JUSTICE: FAIR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN AN
UNFAIR WORLD (2019) (developing a case for socializing legal representation).
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A politics of procedure. To achieve all this, a final step is likely
necessary: developing an alternative vision of procedure and its relationship to our
democratic politics. The past generation has made perhaps clearer than ever that
procedure ineluctably relates to normative and value-laden political choices.
Neoliberal procedure not only expresses its own values and normative
predispositions; it is also connected to a larger political project of diminishing the
role of citizens and courts in regulatory governance and of enfeebling regulatory
governance altogether. Resisting neoliberal procedure would require developing an
alternative democratic vision of the role of procedure in our democratic and
economic life. Such a vision might center the government’s procedures—in courts
and elsewhere—as the infrastructure of democracy.
This is not to deny that building an alternative vision of procedure would be
hard. Such a vision would need to be sustained by ongoing consciousness among
citizens that the government’s procedures are core mechanisms through which the
practice of democracy occurs. It would involve understanding and acting on the
basis that procedure is power. The rise of neoliberal civil procedure has made that
lesson clearer than ever. Procedural design and interpretation can mean the
difference between democracy governing or guarding economic power. For at least
the time being, neoliberal civil procedure places a thumb on one side of the scale.
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